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PRESUMED FRIVOLOUS: APPLICATION OF STRINGENT
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION
DOUGLAS A. BLAZE*
I can sit down and write a lawsuit and feel like my pen's got oil
on it, it's so easy.'
INTRODUCTION
Development of a cynical view about the way in which courts
decide cases is a perennial risk and perhaps an inevitable conse-
quence for any thoughtful student of the law. Such cynicism often
is grounded in a belief that judges are result oriented-that rea-
sons for a decision in a case follow, instead of dictate, the result.
Judicial action that lacks any valid supporting rationale not only
invites such criticism, but also suggests that the courts themselves
have become cynical. This Article examines one example of such
court action, taken in response to the dramatic increase in the vol-
ume of civil rights cases, and attempts to expose the underlying
judicial attitude and to provide an analytical framework free of
that bynicism's influence.
The Problem
Civil rights actions constitute one of the most significant compo-
nents of the federal courts' dockets, at least in terms of sheer
quantity of cases. During the twelve-month period ending June 30,
1987, for example, plaintiffs filed 43,359 civil rights complaints in
the federal district courts, constituting more than 18% of the total
cases commenced. 2 In contrast, during the twelve-month period
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University, College of Law. B.S., Dickinson
College, 1976; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1984.
1. Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 n.18 (D. Or. 1983) (quoting the plaintiff,
Harry Franklin, an extremely prolific prisoner litigant).
2. 1987 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 200-01 (Table C 3B) [All yearly reports of the Administrative Office are cited herein-
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from 1966 to 1967, 2,131 plaintiffs initiated civil rights actions,
comprising barely 3% of the cases filed.3 Thus, the number of civil
rights actions has increased nearly 2,000% from 1966 to 1987,
while the corresponding increase of the total number of cases has
been a mere 235%. 4
Actions brought by prisoners, primarily pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
section 1983,1 account in large part for the dramatic rise in the
volume of civil rights litigation. As the Supreme Court has noted:
For state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working,
and playing are all done under the watchful eye of the
State .... What for a private citizen would be a dispute with
after as 19xx Annual Report]. Only contract actions are filed with greater frequency, at a
rate of 19% of total cases commenced. Id. at 12. The Administrative Office maintains case
data by "statistical year," which runs from July 1 to June 30. As Professors Eisenberg and
Schwab correctly note, several factors concerning the methods by which the Administrative
Office maintains case information affect the data's usefulness. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 662-63 (1987). Those
factors, however, do not affect the data's use here.
The majority of civil rights actions are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). State
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 actions. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980). Although reliable comprehensive data regarding the
number of state court § 1983 actions are not available, one commentator suggests that the
number of such cases is increasing. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A
Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 435 (1984) (analyzing the number of reported
§ 1983 state court appellate decisions). Professor Steinglass' figures, however, suggest that
the volume of state § 1983 litigation remains minor relative to the volume experienced by
the federal courts. Id. (105 reported state appellate decisions in 1983).
3. 1967 Annual Report 114 (number of nonprisoner civil rights actions filed); 1975 An-
nual Report 207 (Table 24) (number of prisoner civil rights actions filed during each of
previous ten years). The Administrative Office segregates prisoner and nonprisoner civil
rights actions. The total number of civil rights cases cited for 1966-67 represents the sum of
the numbers from each category.
4. The number of district court judges has increased only 68% over the same interval,
from 317 in 1967 to 532 in 1987. 1987 Annual Report 49; 1967 Annual Report 94.
5. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Because the statute applies only to conduct occurring under color
of state law, federal prisoners cannot resort to § 1983 to remedy constitutional violations.
Federal prisoners must base such actions on the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his neigh-
bor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with
the State.6
In 1987, for example, prisoner-initiated cases constituted more
than half of the number of civil rights actions filed and almost
10% of all new cases.7 In contrast, prisoner civil rights suits com-
posed only 1.3% of the federal cases fied in 1967.8
Both codrts and commentators have given almost constant at-
tention to the burden arising from the high volume of civil rights
litigation, particularly by prisoners.9 The concern, however, has not
been limited solely to the quantitative aspects of the litigation del-
uge. As early as 1968, one district judge contended that "[a] sub-
stantial number of these cases [civil rights actions] are frivolous."10
This dour assessment has remained a consistent theme in numer-
ous decisions.11
The anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts' characterization
is, at least in part, justified.12 For example, one particularly crea-
6. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
7. 1987 Annual Report 200-01 (Table C 3B) (9.6%). Prisoners filed 22,936 such actions in
the 1987 statistical year-808 by federal prisoners and 22,128 by state prisoners. Id. The
huge disparity in the number of filings between federal and state prisoners has remained
constant over the past three decades. In 1967, the number of civil rights actions by federal
and state prisoners were 58 and 878, respectively. 1975 Annual Report 207 (Table 24). One
federal judge contends that the disparity is the result of differences in the quality of person-
nel and training in the federal and state penal systems. See Doumar, Prisoners' Civil Rights
Suits: A Pompous Delusion, 11:1 GEo. MASON U.L. REv. 1, 9 (1988) (Judge, E.D. Va.).
8. 1967 Annual Report 114; 1975 Annual Report 207 (Table 24).
9. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Doumar,
supra note 7, at 6-7; Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 6 (1980). A true
assessment of the "burden," of course, requires examining how the process of litigating the
actions actually impacts the courts. See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
10. Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968) (Clarie, J.).
11. See, e.g., Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 1985) (registering
concern over possibility that plaintiffs can "concoct" constitutional claims); United States v.
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Experience has demonstrated the
great potential for frivolous and insubstantial suits."); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532
F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Valley); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 n.15
(3d Cir. 1970) (quoting Valley), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
12. One inmate litigant openly threatened, by letter sent to the Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, that unless he was released from prison he would continue to file numerous
civil suits at the taxpayers' expense, and train and encourage other inmates to follow suit.
Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D. Okla. 1985). The inmate, Robert Cotner,
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tive litigant filed actions to vindicate consitutional deprivations
arising from the overwatering of a prison lawn, the baking of des-
serts in aluminum pans and the fact that a statutory seat belt re-
quirement did not apply to bicycles and horses.'3 Other cases,




Courts have developed a number of doctrinal responses intended
to mitigate the perceived burden." The courts also utilize proce-
calculated that the cost to the state to litigate his complaints would be more than $363,000
during his ten-year prison term. His training of other inmates, he contended, would increase
the drain on the public fisc even more. Id. at 1102.
Other inmate plaintiffs have been even more prolific. Perhaps the most notorious is Clovis
Carl Green. Green is credited with filing no less than 600 separate actions, In re Green, 669
F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981), prompting one judge to raise the question of Green's eligibil-
ity for inclusion in The Guinness Book of World Records. Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp.
650, 651 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1981). In fact, legendary litigants, such as Green, have resulted in
significant contributions to the literary quality of judicial opinions. For example, in Green v.
Arnold, Judge Hudspeth equated Green with Loki, a character from Norse mythology, not-
ing: "When the Teutonic gods tired of Loki's troublemaking, they chained him to the rocks
with a poisonous snake suspended above him, dripping poison on Loki .... That case
arose prior to the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 652 n.11; see Demos v. Kinchloe, 563 F. Supp.
30, 32-33 & n.4 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (comparing plaintiff to apples and one-a-day vitamins,
and wagering that plaintiff could "easily dethrone the current champion," Mr. Green).
13. Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1329-32 (D. Or. 1983). Franklin, albeit no Clo-
vis Green, claimed to have filed more than 140 lawsuits. A district judge noted that court
records, however, contained less than 140, but remarked: "I do not know where the others
are, nor do I wish to find out." Id. at 1317 n.3. Franklin has explained his litigious nature:
"The Lord spoke to me, and he told me to file these lawsuits and said, 'You will win big in
your lawsuits.'" Id. at 1316 n.1. To date the prophecy is unfulfilled. See id. at 1318, 1334
(dismissing 37 of Franklin's cases and limiting him to six lawsuits per year).
14. E.g., Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1973) (suit based on claim of viola-
tion of due process by guard taking seven packs of cigarettes from inmate plaintiff's cell).
Former Chief Justice Burger critically noted that Russell required the attention of "one
District judge twice, three Circuit Judges on appeal and six other circuit judges in a second-
ary sense-to say nothing of lawyers, court clerks, bailiffs, court reporters and all the rest."
W. Burger, Speech to American Bar Association (Aug. 6, 1973), quoted in Aldisert, Judicial
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity
and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 569-70 n.55.
15. See Whitman, supra note 9, at 6-7:
During recent years federal judges have elaborated various doctrines that, in
purpose or effect, discourage section 1983 litigants and dispose of specific
cases: standing; exhaustion; immunities; abstention; interpretation of the elev-
enth amendment; res judicata; as well as close construction of the statutory
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dural mechanisms, particularly in the case of prisoner suits, to
screen out meritless actions at the earliest stage of litigation.16 For
example, an increasing number of federal courts require that civil
rights plaintiffs meet a stricter or heightened standard of pleading
in complaints.17
This judicially imposed standard requires "plaintiffs in civil
rights cases. . . to plead facts with specificity.'" Courts have im-
posed the more rigorous standard on all types of civil rights ac-
tions, including cases based on racially discriminatory employment
practices,1 9 conspiracy,20 municipal liability21 and prison condi-
tions.22 One court has even applied the heightened requirement to
complaints filed by the federal government. 3
language, of the scope of constitutional rights, and of the elements of a cause
of action.
16. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 611 (1979). One mechanism utilized is 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982),
the federal in forma pauperis statute, which provides the court with authority to dismiss
"frivolous or malicious" actions filed pursuant to the statute. A significant number of civil
rights actions are filed under the provision. See infra notes 260-82 and accompanying text
(discussing application of § 1915).
17. E.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d. Cir. 1988) (applying
"heightened specificity requirement for section 1983 claims"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989); see Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 COLUM L. REV. 433, 449-50 (1986); Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil
Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677 (1984). But see
United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., 426 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir.) (rejecting stricter stan-
dard), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
This Article does not examine the issue of state court pleading requirements. As men-
tioned supra note 2, most civil rights actions are brought in federal court. At least one state
court, however, has specifically rejected a heightened pleading standard. See Cuhna v. City
of Algona, 334 N.W.2d 591, 596 (Iowa 1983). Moreover, application of overly strict state
pleading rules to civil rights actions might impermissibly impinge on federally created
rights. See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949).
18. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976).
19. See District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1986) (Title VII case
applying strict pleading standard, but finding it satisfied).
20. See Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying "heightened
pleading standard" to conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)).
21. See Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1978) (case dismissed
for failure to meet stricter pleading standard in § 1983 action against police officer and
municipality arising from arrest).
22. See Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1987) (claims brought under § 1983).
23. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1980) (case
dismissed for lack of specificity of complaint based on implied cause of action arising out of
criminal civil rights statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1982), and the fourteenth amendment).
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This Article considers whether a more rigorous standard of
pleading for civil rights complaints is necessary, justified, or even
compatible with the federal civil procedural scheme. Section I
briefly examines the development and function of pleading under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section II reviews the courts'
development and application of the heightened requirement. Sec-
tion III analyzes the higher standard to determine whether it is
consistent with the intent and design of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 4 This section also explores the relationship between
the standard's rationale and other competing policies that it impli-
cates, including the policy of special treatment afforded pro se liti-
gants and the remedial purposes of the civil rights statutes. Section
IV examines whether the stricter pleading requirement is even nec-
essary in view of the numerous alternative mechanisms available to
the courts, particularly those contained in the federal rules.
The Article concludes that both the purpose and effect of a spe-
cial pleading standard for civil rights actions is inconsistent with
modern procedural theory. The requirement of greater factual
specificity is wholly unnecessary and ineffective in achieving its
goal. The rule is simply a reflection of a widespread judicial as-
sumption that most, if not all, civil rights suits lack merit.
I. PLEADING UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
A sixteen year-old-boy could plead under these rules. 5
Simplified pleading was the centerpiece of the new procedural
scheme embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted
in 1938.6 With perhaps illustrative brevity, Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint include only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. '27 Adoption of
24. For an overview of this component of the issue, see Wingate, supra note 17, at 688-92.
25. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 65 (1969)
(quoting Proceedings, CLEV. INST. ON THE FED. RULEs 220 (1938)) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
MILLER].
26. See id. at 59 ("Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading embodied in federal
rules."); Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE
L.J. 914, 917-19 (1976) (Simplified pleading was one of Clark's primary goals for new proce-
dural rules.).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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the simple language of Rule 8 represented a complete rejection of
previous common law and code pleading principles.
Historically, pleading rules were designed to assist directly in
identifying and resolving the merits of the dispute being litigated.
To achieve this purpose, pleading served several crucial functions
in the litigation process: (1) to provide notice of the nature of the
claim or defense; (2) to state the facts the parties believed to exist;
(3) to narrow the issues to be resolved; and (4) to dispose of frivo-
lous claims or defenses.28 Not surprisingly, considering the breadth
of the traditional role of pleadings, extremely strict pleading rules
developed. The pleading process operated on the premise that im-
posing rigid requirements through a series of responsive pleadings
would ultimately either terminate meritless claims or reduce the
dispute to a single dispositive issue of law or fact.29 In application,
however, the process served to dispose of cases on technical
grounds, not on the merits of the underlying disputes. For exam-
ple, failure to plead an essential allegation, regardless of the actual
facts, often resulted in early termination of the litigation by de-
murrer or motion to dismiss.30
The modern role of pleading is much more narrow; the simple
pleading concept that the drafters envisioned is one of limited
function. The federal rules' design constitutes an explicit rejection
of the functional responsibilities that the common law and code
pleading systems placed on pleading. This design also reflects the
view that pleadings are ineffective in performing those functions,
particularly at the very outset of the litigation process before all of
the relevant facts are available to the parties." Resolution on the
merits is the primary goal of the process.32
28. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, at 59-60.
29. See id. at 61.
30. Id. at 60.
31. See Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 311-17 (1938) [hereinafter
Clark, Handmaid of Justice] (commentary by principal draftsman of the federal rules criti-
cizing code and common law pleading, and reviewing intent of proposed federal rules);
Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philoso-
phy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.BA J. 976, 977
(1937) [hereinafter Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] (same).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.").
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The drafters of the federal rules recognized, however, that the
various roles pleadings have played historically are essential to the
litigation process and must be performed by other components of
the new procedural scheme. Under the modern rules, therefore, the
last three of the listed functions are performed by procedural
mechanisms other than pleading.33 For example, discovery 4 and
summary judgment35 now perform the function of identifying and
disclosing the relevant facts.36 Discovery and summary judgment
also can operate to narrow the issues to be tried.3 7 In limited cir-
cumstances, a litigant also may utilize a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim in order to limit the case's scope.3 With regard
to the last function, early termination of frivolous lawsuits, mo-
tions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment that are used
properly provide an avenue for the expeditious elimination of mer-
itless suits.39 In addition, Rule 11 is designed to operate as a deter-
rent to frivolous actions.40
A. Function of Modern Pleading
Under the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
essential function reserved for pleading is to provide "notice" of
the claim or defense. The nature and scope of the concept of "no-
tice," however, is hardly self-evident. The rules do not include, de-
33. No function played by the pleading prior to adoption of the federal rules is the exclu-
sive responsibility of any particular procedural mechanism. For example, summary judg-
ment under Rule 56 is often dependent on the results of discovery. And, of course, pleading,
by commencing the suit and identifying the general nature of the case, remains essential to
the entire process. All the rules are designed to form a dynamic process to achieve the ulti-
mate goal of the procedural scheme-substantive resolution of the dispute's merits. See
generally Marcus, supra note 17.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-36, 45.
35. Id. 56.
36. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, supra note 31, at 318-19.
37. Under Rule 56(a), a party may seek to eliminate particular issues or claims through
"partial summary judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
38. Id. 12(b)(6).
39. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, at 60; see infra Section IV (analyzing mechanisms
available for disposing of frivolous complaints in context of civil rights actions).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (delineating the sanctions available against a party filing pleadings
that are not "well grounded in fact ... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument




fine, or even refer to "notice," nor did the draftsmen use the term
in their comments to the rules or in collateral commentary.41 The
term appears to have rooted in procedural parlance after the Su-
preme Court referred to modern practice as "simplified 'notice
pleading.' ',42 To state that pleadings are to provide notice says lit-
tle. Standing alone the term "notice" is imprecise.43 Notice of
what, to whom, and, most importantly, for what purpose?
An examination of the intended purpose of pleading is therefore
essential to an understanding of notice. Although the principal
draftsman of the rules, Judge Clark, was loath to use the term no-
tice,44 his discussion of the purpose of pleading under the federal
rules provides significant guidance. Most importantly, pleadings no
longer play a dispositive role with regard to the merits of the
case.45 Instead, for Clark, the Advisory Committee properly de-
scribed the "pleading objectives and essentials" by stating:
The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be
stated in general terms; the rules are designed to discourage bat-
tles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the needless
controversies which the codes permitted that served either to
delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a
trial because of mistakes in statement.46
As Clark further commented: "This properly defines and limits the
role to be played by the mutual statement of claims of the parties.
It sets the lawsuit in action and informs the parties and the court
of the general nature of the contentions of the litigants. '4 7
41. In fact, Judge Clark stated in subsequent commentary: "But 'notice' is not a concept
of the Rules, as the Advisory Committee's Note [to the 1955 amendments] . . . so carefully
points out." Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49-50 (1957) [herein-
after Clark, Special Pleading]; see Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J.
177, 181 (1958) [hereinafter Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules] ("No member of the
Advisory Committee, so far as I know, has ever said that, and of course that isn't the real
theory.").
42. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
43. See Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 41, at 181 (concept of no-
tice "isn't anything that we can use with any precision").
44. See Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 49-50.
45. Id. at 47 (Pleadings do "not assume to decide the case.").
46. 1955 Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, Report of Proposed Amendments 18-
19, quoted in Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 41, at 186-87.
47. Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 47.
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"Notice" as embodied in modern pleading thus serves only two
limited and simple functions: to identify the matter in dispute and
to initiate the process of its resolution.48 The identification must
be sufficient to permit the intended recipients of notice, the parties
and the court to move forward in the process. Thus, for the court,
notice permits the case to "be routed through the court
processes, '49 for example, toward "a jury trial, an injunction, or
other kindred interlocutory relief or action. '50 For the opposing
party, such identification permits that party to proceed with litiga-
tion through the appropriate mechanisms, such as answer, discov-
ery and dispositive motions.
B. Specificity Required
Despite the functional simplicity of pleading under the federal
rules, the amount of detail required in the complaint remains a
source of controversy.51 The uncertainty usually revolves around
the degree of factual specificity required.52 The simple answer is, of
course, that absent an express requirement of greater specificity in
the rules,53 pleadings must include enough facts to identify the
matter in dispute. As a result, the required specificity must be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis, identifying the particular matter
at issue. As the Advisory Committee stated, "[G]ood pleading...
requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis
of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that
he wants relief and is entitled to it."'54 A brief examination of the
operation of specific provisions of the rules best illustrates the
practical dimensions of this general principle.
48. By commencing the action, of course, pleading also operates to toll the statute of
limitations. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (filing of complaint commences the action).
49. Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 31, at 316.
50. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 31, at 977.
51. Marcus, supra note 17, at 435-36.
52. Id.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 9 (imposing additional pleading requirements on certain types of
claims or elements of damage); see infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements of Rule 9).
54. 1955 the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, Report of Proposed Amend-




Numerous form complaints that accompany the federal rules are
expressly intended to illustrate the level of specificity required.55
For example, Forms 3 through 8 cover actions based on a debt
owed to the plaintiff.56 All six forms contain the basic allegation
that "defendant owes plaintiff - dollars." That bare allegation,
however, is insufficient. While the identification of the case as an
action for a debt may be enough notice to the court to "route it
through court processes," such an identification is insufficient to
permit the defendant to proceed to answer or file the appropriate
motion.51 The forms thus mandate two additional allegations: (1)
the time the debt arose and (2) the type of debt, such as a promis-
sory note, an account, money lent, and so on.58 This minimal addi-
tional detail provides enough information to identify the disputed
matter sufficiently to permit the defendant to proceed.5 9 "What
more could one properly ask?"60
2. Procedural responses to the complaint
The degree of factual specificity needed also is discernible from
the operation of the rules governing the defendant's available pro-
cedural responses to the complaint.6 1 The functional principle re-
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 84. The rule states: "The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms
are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of
statement which the rules contemplate." Id.
56. Id. (Forms 3-8).
57. For example, in the case of an ongoing commercial relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, simply asserting that a debt exists is insufficient to isolate it from debts arising
from other commercial transactions between the parties.
58. Id., Form 3 (promissory note), Form 4 (on account), Form 5 (goods sold and deliv-
ered), Form 6 (money lent), Form 7 (money paid by mistake), and Form 8 (money had and
received).
59. The forms also require a statement of jurisdiction as required by FED. R. Civ. P.
S(a)(1).
60. Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 31, at 317 (Clark's query after reviewing re-
quired allegations under Form 9 relating to automobile negligence cases).
61. A distinction is drawn between the procedural responses challenging the factual suffi-
ciency of the allegations and procedural responses challenging the substantive validity of
the claim asserted as revealed by those allegations. For example, a defendant, after complet-
ing the pleading process by answering, may move for judgment on the pleadings. FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). Such a motion would challenge the claim substantively, solely on the basis of
the contents of the pleadings, for example, statute of limitations. Motions for failure to state
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mains the same: Do the allegations sufficiently identify the matter
in dispute to permit'the defendant to proceed with those proce-
dural responses-to answer, to pursue discovery, or to file disposi-
tive motions?
a. Answer
The Rules impose minimal burdens on the defendant with re-
gard to the contents of a responsive pleading. Rule 8(b) requires a
defendant in the answer: (1) to set forth defenses; (2) to admit or
deny the allegations of the complaint as appropriate; or (3) to state
that the defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to
permit an admission or denial of the allegations.6 2 Under Rule
8(b), therefore, an appropriate response to a vague allegation in a
complaint is a denial or statement of a lack of knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to admit or deny.63 To the extent that vague alle-
gations in the complaint render it difficult to present defenses, a
defendant always can assert applicable defenses by way of amend-
ment at almost any later stage of the litigation.64 Thus, a defend-
ant easily can proceed to discovery to secure greater information
regarding the plaintiff's claim in the face of the vaguest of
allegations.6 5
a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) normally also would fall within this rubric. Rule
12(b)(6) motions, however, often are used to challenge the factual sufficiency of the allega-
tions. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 12(b)(6).
The defendant also may respond by moving to strike any "redundant, immaterial, imper-
tinent, or scandalous matter." FED. R CIV. P. 12(f). Such a motion, obviously, attacks the
pleadings for including too much, not too little.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) also imposes a "good faith" requirement on the defendant in
responding to the plaintiff's allegations. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11. However, when a defendant
is uncertain about the law or facts on which the plaintiff relies, she may deny. See Schultz v.
Manor House of Madison, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 16, 17-18 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
64. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 15 (outlining policy of liberal grant of amendments to pleadings,
even after trial in appropriate circumstances); Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 640 (8th
Cir. 1966) (court permitted amendment to assert defense of statute of limitations after pre-
trial conference).
65. Of course, proceeding with discovery in the face of vague allegations may not be the
most efficient nor cost effective approach. In fact, vague allegations that fail to identify
sufficiently the matter in dispute may prevent a party from adequately assessing the most
effective course to pursue. In such a case, alternatives are available. See infra notes 66-70
and accompanying text.
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b. Motion for more definite statement
Alternatively, the defendant faced with vague or confusing alle-
gations may request greater detail by moving for a more definite
statement of the claim under Rule 12(e).66 The circumstances in
which such a motion is proper, however, are rather limited. Rule
12(e) provides that a party may make the motion "[i]f a pleading
, * * is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading. ' 67 Yet, as noted above, a
defendant ordinarily can answer even the vaguest of allegations by
a denial. Rule 12(e) motions are not to be used when discovery is
more appropriate.68 Most importantly, even when the motion is ap-
propriate and granted, the only result is that the plaintiff must
then amend the complaint to provide the detail specifically re-
quested."' The effect of Rule 12(e), applied properly, is minimal
and supports the conclusion that only very limited specificity is
required.70
66. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(e).
67. Id. At least one court has held that a court may sua sponte require more detail under
the authority of Rule 12(e). See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985). The
court's conclusion is curious as the language of the rule focuses exclusively on the ability of
a party to prepare a responsive pleading.
68. See Schultz v. Manor House of Madison, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 16, 17 (W.D. Wis. 1970). The
court stated: "It is to be noted that a motion for more definite statement is not to assist in
getting facts in preparation for trial as such. Other rules relating to discovery ... exist for
this purpose." Id. (quoting Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, 269 F.2d 126, 132 (1959)). The
original text of Rule 12(e) permitted a defendant to move for a "bill of particulars of any
matter" necessary "to prepare for trial." The 1946 amendments to the rule deleted this
heavily criticized provision. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(e) advisory committee note (discussing
1946 amendments).
Of course, vague allegations may render even discovery difficult; a party may be unable to
determine what to pursue other than generalized requests for more factual detail underlying
the claim. In that case, arguably, a motion for a more definite statement is appropriate
because the party is unable to proceed effectively toward discovery.
69. FED, R. Civ. P. 12(e).
70. Not surprisingly, Judge Clark thought that Rule 12(e) was superfluous. In fact, he
fought hard to keep it out of the federal rules entirely.
The question may be asked, If the motion to make a more definite statement is
so seldom used or seldom granted, why is it left in the rules? My answer is that
I did my very best as Reporter to have it left out. It so rarely serves a useful
purpose that I think the opportunity it affords for delay outweighs any utility
it might be thought to have ....
Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 41, at 185.
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In summary, pleading under the federal rules plays a relatively
unimportant and limited role in the litigation process. The com-
plaint operates only to initiate the process and to identify the na-
ture of the dispute. The rules are crafted to insulate the pleading
phase of litigation from any involvement in substantive resolution
of the merits, except in limited and narrowly defined circum-
stances. Despite these simple concepts, courts continue to strive to
give pleadings a larger role.
II. THE STRINGENT PLEADING STANDARD
A. Development of the Standard
The exact genesis of a special rule of pleading applicable to civil
rights actions is difficult to establish. In the early 1960s, even prior
to the litigation deluge, courts began to dismiss civil rights com-
plaints for failure to allege specific facts in support of conclusory
allegations,71 particularly when claims of conspiracy were in-
volved.72 Those courts, however, stopped short of identifying a
"special rule" applicable only to civil rights actions.
In Valley v. Maule,'7  a Connecticut district court first articu-
lated a rule uniquely applicable to civil rights suits. The plaintiffs
asserted a conspiracy claim, pursuant to sections 1983 and 1985 of
Title 42, against a municipality, several members of the police de-
partment and a private company.7 4 The court dismissed the com-
plaint as "utterly devoid of any factual allegations which allege
overt acts or a purposeful deprivation of rights. ' 75 In response to
the plaintiffs' argument, the court acknowledged that detailed fac-
tual allegations were unnecessary under the theory of notice plead-
71. See Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967) (complaint against police and
prison officials dismissed as too "broad and conclusory" when impossible to tell which de-
fendant participated in various conduct alleged); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86, 89 (2d
Cir. 1965) (complaint of reverse discrimination by fired white physician dismissed as con-
taining only "vague and conclusory allegations").
72. See Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964) (dis-
missing §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims for failure to allege facts of overt acts); Pugliano
v. Staziak, 231 F. Supp. 347, 351 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim be-
cause "unsupported conclusory allegations of complaint render it fatally deficient").
73. 297 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968).
74. Id. at 959.
75. Id. at 960.
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ing. "As a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an excep-
tion has been created for cases brought under the Civil Rights
Acts.,,78
The court, however, failed to identify any direct legal support
for its broad pronouncement. Instead, it cited by analogy to four
cases.7 Even by analogy, the cited authorities are dubious at best.
None of the courts in any of the four cases relied on unique plead-
ing requirements. Indeed, such a rule was not necessary for the
result in those cases. Three of the cases involved claims of rights
violations by conspiracy.78 The courts held that, as a matter of
substantive law, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is an
essential element of the cause of action.7 9 As a result, a complaint
must include factual allegations of an overt act to state a claim for
civil conspiracy. 0 The cases thus revolved around the substantive
law of civil conspiracy, not simple pleading requirements. In fact,
in one of the three cases the court expressly rejected a heightened
pleading requirement, noting that a plaintiff "should not be re-
quired here to plead his evidence."' ' Moreover, the fourth case
upon which the court in Valley relied, Jemzura v. Belden,8 2 explic-
itly and approvingly referred to the notice pleading concepts con-
tained in the federal rules.8 3
76. Id.
77. The court used a "cf." signal. Id. at 961.
78. Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964); Hoffman v.
Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th Cir. 1959); Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270, 273-74
(N.D. Ohio 1964).
79. E.g., Hoffman, 268 F.2d at 295.
80. Id. In comparing civil and criminal conspiracy actions, the court in Hoffman stated:
"In a civil conspiracy, the conspiracy itself is not a cause of action, without overt acts, be-
cause again it is the overt act which moves the conspiracy from the area of thought and
conversation into action and causes the civil injury and resulting damage." Id.
81. Id. at 294-95. The court stated further:
We question some of the broad language used in the decisions concerning
"conclusory allegations." We think the validity of the complaint at the plead-
ing stage cannot be disposed on the basis of the presence of so-called "conclu-
sionary" allegations of "conspiracy" or "conspiring" of "discriminatory intent"
or of "acting under color of state law or authority" but that as to these ele-
ments of a cause of action such allegations are proper and necessary.
Id. at 295.
82. 281 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
83. Id. at 204 (court considered sua sponte dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)
requirement of "short and plain statement" of claim and entitlement to relief). Similarly, in
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In Valley, however, the court relied more heavily on policy con-
siderations than precedent to support an exception to the normal
pleading standards. The court stated:
The reason for this exception is clear. In recent years there has
been an increasingly large volume of cases brought under the
Civil Rights Acts. A substantial number of these cases are frivo-
lous or should be litigated in the State courts; they all cause
defendants-public officials, policemen and citizens alike-con-
siderable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It
is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and in-
substantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still keep
the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims. 4
Under the Valley analysis, therefore, the creation or existence of
a "special" pleading rule is founded on three points. First, many
civil rights actions are frivolous, a point that the courts in the cases
cited in Valley also made. 5 Second, many civil rights complaints
should be litigated in state courts rather than federal courts.8
Third, civil rights actions potentially subject government and its
employees to unnecessary harassment and embarrassment. 7 The
court also recognized, however, that the competing duty of the fed-
eral courts to remain open to valid claims created tension.8 Based
on the authority and rationale of Valley, a number of other courts
Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964), the court remained true to the
notice pleading concept by treating the defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for more
definite statement under Rule 12(e). Id. at 274.
84. Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Conn. 1968).
85. See Hoffman, 268 F.2d at 295 ("[Ain astonishing few of the actions for violations of
civil rights have any real merit."); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131,
137 (2d Cir. 1964) (expressing concern about "inviting every party to a state proceeding
angered at delay to file a complaint"); Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp. 200, 207 (N.D.N.Y.
1968) (quoting Powell).
86. See, e.g., Bargainer, 233 F. Supp. at 274 (injury alleged did not involve a "national, as
opposed to [a] state" right).
87. Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978).
88. Valley, 297 F. Supp. at 960-61.
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have embraced a similar pleading requirement, 8 albeit not always
explicitly.90
B. Operation of the Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
serves as the defendant's principal mechanism for presenting to
the court the issue of compliance with the stringent pleading stan-
dard.91 According to the courts adhering to the requirement, a
complaint lacking in sufficient factual detail fails to state a claim.92
Generally, courts enter such dismissals with prejudice. In recogni-
tion of the competing policy to remain receptive to valid claims,
however, most courts provide plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
before entering a judgment with prejudice. 3 Yet, courts will deny
an opportunity to amend before dismissal if such an amendment
would be futile or if the plaintiff failed to exercise previous oppor-
tunities to amend. 4 Although the basic operation of the standard
is fairly consistent among the courts, a variety of specific applica-
tions of the heightened standard have evolved.
89. See, e.g., Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1975) (complaint must
contain "at least some allegations of facts indicating a deprivation of civil rights"); Kauff-
man v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275 (3d Cir.) ("[A]llegations in a civil rights case must be
specifically pleaded."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. at 1137
("particularized fact pleading" required).
90. E.g., Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) (complaints containing
vague or conclusory allegations of deprivation subject to dismissal).
91. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
92. E.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying
standard in ruling on 12(b)(6) motion), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Valley, 297 F.
Supp. at 960-61 (same).
93. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 923 (3d Cir. 1976) (remanding
with directions to allow amendment within reasonable period); Monitor v. City of Chicago,
653 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (allowing plaintiff 30 days to amend; failure to
amend will result in dismissal with prejudice); Townsend v. Frame, 587 F. Supp. 369, 372
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (giving plaintiff 20 days to amend).
The necessity of providing an opportunity to amend, however, limits the efficacy of the
rule in achieving the objective of expeditiously terminating meritless cases. See infra note
340 and accompanying text.
94. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 1985) (failure to pursue
prior opportunity justifies denial of leave to amend); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th
Cir. 1982) (previous amendment failed to cure defects; no further opportunity to amend
permitted due to complete failure "to allege requisite facts"); United States v. City of Phila-
delphia, 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) (deliberate rejection of opportunity to amend justi-
fied denial of leave to amend).
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C. Application of the Standard
A number of jurisdictions, exemplified by the Third Circuit,
have adopted the heightened standard for all civil rights actions.9 5
Other courts have utilized the standard for particular types of
claims or defenses, such as cases involving claims of municipal lia-
bility, 6 or implicating immunity defenses.9 7 In practice, every cir-
cuit has applied some form of a heightened requirement, 8 even
though several circuits have expressly rejected the concept.9 9 The
stringent standard has proved to be a source of controversy, confu-
sion and inconsistent application.1 e0
1. General application to civil rights actions
The Third Circuit is the recognized leader in use of the stringent
requirement,10' having applied it with enthusiasm and aplomb. Re-
lying on the rationale of Valley and the authority of the earlier
case of Negrich v. Hohn,02 the Third Circuit's requirement of
greater factual specificity applies to all types of civil rights ac-
95. See, e.g., District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1986).
96. See, e.g., La Plant v. Frazier, 564 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
97. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 1986).
98. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1985) (facts needed in cases
alleging municipal liability); Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979) (conclusory
allegations insufficient); Smith v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 592 F.2d 225, 226
(4th Cir. 1979) ("conclusory," "vague," or "general" allegations insufficient); Hall v. Penn-
sylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978) (same); Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d
551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) (same); Wetherington v. Phillips, 526 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1975)
(same), aff'g, 380 F. Supp. 426, 428 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244
(6th Cir. 1971) (same); Jewell v. City of Covington, 425 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970); Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir.
1977) (conclusory allegations insufficient); Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir.
1976) (same); Coopersmith v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 465 F.2d 993, 994 (10th Cir. 1972)
(same).
99. See, e.g., Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983) (civil rights plaintiff
"not required to set out the facts in detail"); United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., 426 F.2d
539, 542 (10th Cir.) (refusal to reinstate fact pleading requirement in civil rights cases), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
100. See Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 459 (N.D. IM. 1982) (discussing the
"substantial disagreement in this district over what level of specificity in pleading is re-
quired under § 1983").
101. Marcus, supra note 17, at 449.
102. 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
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tions.103 The rule is based on the premise that plaintiffs "employ-
ing civil rights statutes are more likely to bring frivolous lawsuits
than other federal plaintiffs, ' 104 which creates a significant risk
that public officials will be subjected needlessly to harassment and
expense."05 As a result, a complaint must include sufficient facts to
"satisfy" the court that the claim is not frivolous. e06 Rotolo v. Bor-
ough of Charleroi10 7 illustrates this point.
In Rotolo, the plaintiff's substantive allegations were extremely
straightforward. Rotolo was employed as a building inspector by
the defendant borough. 0  According to his complaint, Rotolo was
fired pursuant to a vote of the councilmen defendants because he
had "exercised his First Amendment privileges," constituting a de-
nial of his constitutional rights. 09 Applying the specificity require-
ment, the court affirmed dismissal of the complaint as "vague and
conclusory" because it failed to include allegations concerning
"when, where, and how" Rotolo had exercised his first amendment
rights. 10 The court stated that it could not determine from the
complaint whether Rotolo's activity was subject to first amend-
ment protection, or whether the activity was causally linked to his
discharge. 111 The court's invocation of a higher level of pleading
specificity thus related solely to the court's ability to evaluate the
merit of the action.
Third Circuit courts, however, have proffered the additional ra-
tionale that the rule is necessary to provide the defendant with
103. E.g., La Plant v. Frazier, 564 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stringent standard
applies to all complaints "arising under Federal Civil Rights statutes"). In fact, one court
applied the standard to a complaint filed by the federal government based on an implied
cause of action arising out of the criminal provisions of the civil rights acts, 18 U.S.C. §§
241-42, and the fourteenth amendment. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187,
204 (3d Cir. 1980).
104. Frazier v. Southeastern Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 67 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986).
105. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 204 (citing Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-
61 (D. Conn. 1968)).
106. District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1986).
107. 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 921.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 923.
111. Id. As further explanation, the court stated: "The allegations state no facts upon
which to weigh the substantiality of the claim; they do not aver the content of the alleged
first amendment exercise." Id.
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sufficient notice of the claim.112 This rationale is superfluous. The
federal rules require that the defendant receive adequate notice
sufficient to permit a responsive pleading.113 Moreover, under the
federal rules inadequate notice will support the grant of a motion
for a more definite statement, not dismissal for failure to state a
claim." 4 Again, Rotolo is illustrative. According to the court, the
plaintiff failed to set forth adequate facts establishing that the ex-
ercise of his first amendment rights caused his termination."5 Yet
the defendants, perhaps more than the plaintiff, had knowledge of
the facts relating to the cause of the termination. Notice to a de-
fendant, therefore, cannot provide a valid rationale for applying a
stringent pleading standard.
Moreover, the degree of specificity required is necessarily rele-
gated to a case-by-case determination. As the court in Frazier v.
Southeast Transportation Authority" 6 concluded after attempting
to develop a bright line rule:
Inevitably, the sufficiency of a complaint must be determined on
a case-by-case basis. The factors discussed in prior decisions are
helpful to a court making such an evaluation, but they must be
considered in light of the purposes of the specificity rule. Thus,
the crucial questions are whether sufficient facts are pleaded to
determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide de-
fendants with adequate notice to frame an answer." 7
The court in Frazier recognized simultaneously, however, that a
complaint should not be used to evaluate the plaintiff's proof, es-
pecially in civil rights cases in which "much of the evidence can be
developed only through discovery."" 8 The court believed that ex-
pecting plaintiffs to know fully, much less plead, the details of the
112. Frazier v. Southeastern Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
114. If a plaintiff is permitted to amend, applying the standard through a 12(b)(6) motion
operates much like a motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e). The key differ-
ence is that the heightened fact pleading requirement significantly alters the traditional
standard of adequate notice set forth in Rule 12(e). See supra notes 66-67 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Rule 12(e) standard).
115. Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 923.
116. 785 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1986).




practices or conduct upon which their claim is based was unreason-
able.119 Yet, the court made no effort to reconcile these competing
policy considerations. Perhaps reflecting this conflict, consistent
application of the standard has proved illusory.120
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits also
have expressly adopted a stringent standard applicable to all civil
rights actions. 2' A number of other courts have imposed a stricter
requirement, but with far less forthrightness. Instead of openly ac-
knowledging that they are giving civil rights complaints unique
treatment, courts obscure their actions by relying on general no-
tions of overly vague or conclusory allegations. 122 For example, al-
though the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has expressly
rejected a heightened requirement,'2  courts within the circuit reg-
ularly dismiss civil rights complaints as being too "conclusory."' 2 4
In purpose and effect, of course, the result is the same: early dis-
missal of complaints that do not display merit affirmatively
through factual detail.
2. Claims of municipal liability
A municipality can be held liable under section 1983 of Title 42
only for constitutional violations that its official policies and cus-
tomary practices cause.' 2 5 Liability cannot be based solely on a
119. Id.
120. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1988) (majority
response to dissenting judge's criticism of application of rule), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989); District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority application of rule in reversing dismissal by district court).
121. See, e.g., Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1985); Cohen v. Illi-
nois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1135
(1979); accord Haas v. Berrien County Sheriff's Dep't, 658 F. Supp. 877, 879 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
122. E.g., Winters v. Palumbo, 512 F. Supp. 7, 9 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (dismissal appropriate
because "complaint is so conclusory as to be insufficient to support a claim under § 1983").
123. See United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., 426 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 832 (1970).
124. See, e.g., Wiggins v. New Mexico Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir.
1981) (dismissal appropriate when complaints contain only "bare conclusory allegations"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D. Okla.
1985) ("bald conclusions, unsupported by allegations of fact, are legally insufficient").
125. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978).
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theory of respondeat superior.126 Normally, therefore, a single inci-
dent of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee is insuf-
ficient to support liability.127
This notion of limited municipal liability, coupled with the more
general concern about frivolous civil rights actions, has led a num-
ber of courts to develop a particular application of the heightened
pleading standard. 128 A plaintiff asserting a claim of municipal lia-
bility must allege specific facts to support a general allegation that
a policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation.' 9 Accord-
ing to the courts, the rationale underlying the pleading rule is even
more compelling in a municipal case due to the potential scope of
discovery and the issues to be tried. 30 Thus, the rule in such cases
implicates the concern, first articulated in Valley,' 3' of undue har-
assment of public officials. As the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained:
[A] claim of municipal liability based on an alleged policy re-
flected by a pattern of prior episodes will inevitably risk placing
an entire police department on trial. Sweeping discovery will be
sought to unearth episodes in which allegedly similar unconsti-
tutional actions have been taken, and the trial will then require
litigation of every episode occurring in the community that
counsel believes can be shown to involve a similar constitutional
violation. 13
2
As a result, general allegations of a municipal custom or policy are
insufficient to "'justify the extensive litigation such a claim
entails.' ,3
126. Id.
127. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981).
128. In fact, the Third Circuit has stated that application of the rule is even more com-
pelling in a case alleging municipal liability. See La Plant v. Frazier, 564 F. Supp. 1095, 1098
(E.D. Pa. 1983) ("policy underlying the special pleading requirement . . . is even more
pronounced").
129. See id. at 1098.
130. Id.; see also Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1976);
Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978).
131. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
132. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. at 1137. But see Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d
Cir. 1983) (subsequently rejecting higher standard).
133. Loza v. Lynch, 625 F. Supp. 850, 853 (D. Conn. 1986) (quoting Ambrogio, 456 F.
Supp. at 1137) ("boilerplate pleading" subject to dismissal).
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For example, in Strauss v. City of Chicago,3 the plaintiff sued
the city and a John Doe police officer based on the officer's alleged
assault of him following an unlawful arrest. As the predicate for
the claim against the city, the plaintiff alleged that the city had a
"custom and practice": (1) of hiring into the police department in-
dividuals with a prior history of brutality; (2) of retaining as police
officers individuals who demonstrated consistent brutality and dis-
regard of civil rights while employed by the city; (3) of allowing
individuals in custody to be silenced by physical abuse; and (4) of
conducting sham investigations into charges of police miscon-
duct.135 The plaintiff included statistical information regarding the
number of complaints filed against the police department to sup-
port the allegations.""6 The court, however, granted the defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the complaint lacked any facts to
suggest that the alleged policies actually existed. 137
Prior to discovery, however, the plaintiff normally would not
have available the factual predicate that the court in Strauss re-
quired. A plaintiff, of course, would have to undertake reasonable
investigation and have a good faith basis for the allegation of a
policy or practice.138 In Strauss, the plaintiff had such a ba-
sis-statistical information regarding the large volume of similar
complaints against the police. By failing to permit the case to pro-
ceed on that basis, the court rendered assertion of such a claim
nearly impossible, as the court even acknowledged.3 9 For the
court, however, concern that constitutional violations might go un-
remedied simply was not sufficient to justify exposing the city to
litigation, not to mention liability. 40
134. 760 F.2d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 766.
136. Id. at 768.
137. Id. at 770.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring good faith basis for allegation).
139. Strauss, 760 F.2d at 769-70.
140. Id. As a result, the decision has received strong criticism even within the Seventh
Circuit. See Payne v. City of LaSalle, 610 F. Supp. 606, 608 & n.3 (N.D. IM. 1985) (charac-
terizing the problem as a "double Catch 22. . . (Catch 44?)"). As a result, other courts have
held that allegations of the type set forth in Strauss are more than sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss. E.g., Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (It
is "improper to dismiss [a] . . . complaint alleging municipal liability even if the claim is
based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct con-
formed to official policy, custom, or practice.").
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3. Claims implicating immunity defense
The immunity doctrine seeks to minimize subjecting public offi-
cials to harassment by litigation and exposure to liability. The doc-
trine is an affirmative defense that the defendant normally must
plead, 14 and is a complete defense in a damage action.142 This doc-
trine mitigates litigation burdens through several procedural de-
vices. For example, the denial of a motion for summary judgment
that is based on an immunity defense claim is immediately appeal-
able despite its interlocutory nature.143 Primarily, these devices
avoid exposing the officials and their agencies to broad discov-
ery.14' Several courts have relied upon the more stringent pleading
standard to achieve that objective. 4 5
For example, in Elliott v. Perez,46 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that when an action implicates an immunity de-
fense, the plaintiff must set forth "detailed facts supporting the
contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained."'4 The
court reasoned that the immunity doctrine and the modern theory
of "notice" pleading inherently conflict.14 1
In view of the purposes of the immunity defense, . we con-
clude that allowing broadly-worded complaints, such as those of
the plaintiffs here, which leaves to traditional pretrial deposi-
tions, interrogatories, and requests for admission the develop-
ment of the real facts underlying the claim, effectively eviscer-
ates important functions and protections of official immunity.149
141. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
142. See id. at 806-07, 817-18. Officials whose special functions or constitutional status
require complete protection from suit, for example judges and legislators when performing
judicial or legislative duties, are entitled to "absolute immunity." Id. at 807. Other public
officials are entitled to immunity only if they are performing their duties in "good
faith"-referred to as "qualified immunity." Id. at 814-15.
143. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1986).
144. Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (designed to avoid "primary
evil" of "broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons").
145. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084 (1985); Haas v. Berrien County Sheriff's Dep't, 658 F. Supp. 877, 879 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
146. 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
147. Id. at 1482.
148. Id. at 1479.
149. Id. at 1476.
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Judges thus have an independent duty to ascertain whether the
defense of immunity applies; "[t]he trial judge may not wait on
motions or other actions by the parties or counsel."150 The best
mechanism to fulfill this duty, according to the court in Elliott, is
a requirement of sufficient factual specificity in the complaint to
permit the court to evaluate the applicability of the defense. 151
In Elliott, the court's approach, however, perverted the normal
burdens of pleading allocated to the plaintiff and defendant. Be-
cause immunity is an affirmative defense, normally the defendant
would bear the burden of raising the issue by motion or answer.'52
Under the Elliott holding, however, the plaintiff must anticipate
and affirmatively negate the defense with sufficient factual detail
in the complaint.15 3 As in the case of municipal liability, often the
facts necessary to meet such a pleading requirement are not availa-
ble to the plaintiff prior to discovery. As a result, application of a
higher standard may potentially penalize a plaintiff when the de-
fendant controls the crucial facts. 54 Fortunately, in recognition of
this problem, some courts have applied a modification of the rule,
permitting limited discovery only on narrow factual issues relating
to the immunity defense. 15  Such an approach protects public offi-
cials without unduly limiting the opportunity to pursue potentially
meritorious claims.
In addition to the specific applications discussed above, courts
have "tightened the application of Rule 8 where the very nature of
the litigation compels it.' 56 For example, courts have utilized the
stringent requirement in cases founded on claims of retaliation 57
150. Id. at 1480.
151. Id. at 1480-82.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
153. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1481-82.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c); see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
155. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1053 (9th Cir. 1988) (giving direc-
tions to district court on remand to determine whether complaint alleged intentional dis-
crimination sufficiently to avoid summary disposition), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989); Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discovery
limited to immunity issue).
156. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.
157. See Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194-95 (2d Cir. 1987) ("complaint which alleges
retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleadings alone");
Winters v. Palumbo, 512 F. Supp. 7, 8-9 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (standard applied to claim of
retaliation for being called as a witness).
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and claims of conspiracy under sections 1983 and 1985 of Title
42.158 With very limited exception,159 courts applying the stringent
pleading standard have not examined critically the doctrinal foun-
dations, policy implications, or effect of their action.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD
I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues
between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on
the paper pleadings.16 0
Regardless of the specific application of a heightened pleading
standard, the underlying rationale that the courts have articulated
remains the same: The vast majority of civil rights actions are friv-
olous. The general purpose of the higher standard is, therefore, to
mitigate the burden that the unwieldy quantity and depressing
quality of such actions place on the courts and defendants. This
general purpose has three specific overlapping objectives: (1) to re-
duce the burden on the courts through identification and termina-
tion of meritless cases at the outset of the litigation process; (2) to
reduce any potential harassment of defendants or interference with
their duties; and (3) to provide defendants with adequate notice of
the facts underlying the action so that they can take early action to
terminate the litigation through motion and/or assertion of appro-
priate defenses.'
158. See, e.g., Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) ("conclusory" allega-
tions not sufficient to sustain claim of governmental conspiracy); Kauffman v. Moss, 420
F.2d 1270, 1272, 1275-76 (3d Cir.) (standard applied to §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Haile v. Village of Sag Harbor, 639 F. Supp. 718, 721
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[V]ague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to
state a claim under § 1985.").
159. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 210-13 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting) (analyzing and rejecting standard); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532
F.2d 920, 923-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (same); Thompson v. Village of
Evergreen Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. IlM. 1980) (same).
160. Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 46.
161. In practice these three objectives overlap. For example, the second objective, reduc-
ing harassment and interference, is duplicative of the other two goals. Terminating frivolous
actions early obviously achieves a reduction of the possibility that defendants will be sub-
jected to harassment and interference. Additionally, the other two objectives differ only
[Vol. 31:935
PRESUMED FRIVOLOUS
While these functions may seem laudable, the fact is that the
basic purpose of a higher standard of pleading, and therefore its
operation, is directly contrary to the theory and function of plead-
ing under the federal rules. Moreover, applying such a requirement
undermines the remedial purposes of the civil rights statutes and
virtually ignores the protective treatment traditionally afforded
pro se plaintiffs.
A. Federal Rules
As discussed previously, the function of modern pleading is ex-
tremely limited. The complaint simply initiates the litigation pro-
cess and identifies the nature of the claim for the court and de-
fendant. As such, the complaint is not directly involved in the
determination and resolution of the merits of the dispute.16 2 Un-
fortunately, the heightened pleading requirement transmutes the
complaint into a device for determining the merits-a function ex-
pressly rejected in the development of the federal rules.163
As a result, the heightened pleading requirement perverts the
entire procedural balance that the rules established and creates a
unique class of litigation. Indeed, the standard is avowedly
designed to permit the court to evaluate the validity of the claim
at the very outset of the litigation. 64 In fact, the general require-
ment of greater factual specificity has evolved rapidly into a re-
quirement that the plaintiff "satisfy" or convince the court factu-
ally that the claim asserted is not frivolous. 65 This unique
procedural requirement is not imposed pre-trial in any other type
of case.
with regard to the beneficiary of early termination of frivolous actions-the court or the
defendants.
162. The ultimate goal of the litigation process is, of course, resolving the dispute, nor-
mally through consideration of the merits by the court, the parties, or both. Thus, to the
extent that pleadings are a part of that process, they do play an indirect role in resolving the
merits.
163. See, e.g., Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 46; see also supra notes 41-50
and accompanying text.
164. See Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D. Conn. 1968) ("It is an important
public policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the
litigation.").
165. See District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1986).
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1. Diminished role for discovery
One principle effect of the standard's application is diminish-
ment, if not obliteration, of the role of discovery in the litigation
process under the federal rules. In the normal case, the plaintiff
must plead only facts and general allegations sufficient to satisfy
Rule 8(a)(2). The factual basis need be derived only from the facts
known- to the plaintiff, subject to the requirement of Rule 11 that
the plaintiff make a reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts. 6
In fact, as long as the plaintiff has met the strictures of Rule 11,
most courts permit her to make allegations based only upon "infor-
mation and belief.' 6 7 Further factual support for the claim can be
gleaned through the discovery process.
The stringent pleading standard flies in the face of this ap-
proach. Under the standard, a plaintiff must have facts sufficient
to demonstrate the validity of a civil rights claim prior to discov-
ery. 68 This requirement of a threshold showing of factual valid-
ity-a requirement that takes hold in advance of discov-
ery-imposes an enormous burden that many civil rights plaintiffs
find insuperable. In civil rights cases, the very facts that the courts
require plaintiffs to set forth in the complaint are often in the ex-
clusive control of the defendants.' For example, a municipality
normally controls the information necessary to establish a policy or
customary practice that would support a claim of municipal liabil-
ity based upon acquiesence in police misconduct, such as the disci-
plinary records of the officers involved. Such information would be
available only through discovery, creating a classic Catch 22: Dis-
covery is necessary to uncover the factual predicate necessary to
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
167. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1224, at 155-57.
168. See Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 1986) (qualified immu-
nity defense); Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978) (municipal
liability).
169. See Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982), in which the
court stated:
We are at a loss as to how any plaintiff, including a civil rights plaintiff, is
supposed to allege with specificity prior to discovery acts to which he or she
personally was not exposed, but which provide evidence necessary to sustain
the plaintiff's claim, i.e., that there was an official policy or a de facto custom
which violated the Constitution.
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pursue discovery.7 Moreover, crucial facts often do not emerge
until discovery or even trial. 7 ' Absent such discovery, a plaintiff is
relegated, at best, to state law tort claims-a result that the courts
welcome, if not specifically intend.172
2. Perversion of the function of Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) is the defendant's primary mechanism to challenge
complaints for not complying with the heightened pleading stan-
dard. Under the federal rules, however, Rule 12(b)(6) is not in-
tended to serve the function of assessing the complainant's factual
sufficiency. 73 Use of the rule to apply the standard, therefore,
highlights the inherent conflict between the standard and the fed-
eral rules.
In Conley v. Gibson, 74 the Supreme Court discussed the factual
specificity the plaintiff must provide to survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) .175 In Conley, black members of a union
brought suit under the Railway Labor Act alleging that the union
had not fairly represented black members.' The union moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on two grounds. First, the union ar-
gued that the complaint did not "state a claim" 77 because it
"failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations
170. A more difficult case is presented when the plaintiff alleges a claim of inaction in the
face of pervasive misconduct toward a particular group-blacks for example-in contrast to
a claim based simply on general misconduct by the individual arresting officers. Absent facts
to support the claim, any suit against the city would be subject to dismissal prior to discov-
ery. More importantly, without the city as a named defendant, even a viable claim against
the officers would not support discovery broad enough to develop a claim against the city.
Conduct of non-involved officers would not be relevant, even under the low relevance
threshold of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), to the claim against the involved police. See Payne v.
City of LaSalle, 610 F. Supp. 606, 608 & n.3 (N.D. M11. 985).
171. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
172. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976). "A substantial
number of these cases... should be litigated in the State courts." Id. (quoting Valley v.
Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968)).
173. See, e.g., Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 41, at 194. In a
12(b)(6) proceeding, "if the face of the pleading doesn't show all the facts, you are fully
entitled to bring them up by an affidavit." Id.
174. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
175. Id. at 45-48.
176. Id. at 42-43.
177. Id. at 43.
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of discrimination.' 1 78 In response, the Court reasoned that, in
terms of factual specificity necessary to state a claim, the standard
of Rule 8(a)(2) governed:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.1 9
Applying the standard of Rule 8, the Court held that the com-
plaint stated a claim. 180 The Court further noted that the plaintiffs
could secure disclosure of a more precise basis of the claim through
discovery and other pre-trial procedures. 18'
Second, the union's motion raised the issue of whether the plain-
tiffs were entitled to relief on the claim under the Railway Labor
Act. 8 2 The Court stated "that a complaint should not be dismissed
... unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief." 18 3 Treating all of the allegations of the complaint as true, the
Court found that the plaintiffs' general allegation of discriminatory
representation would entitle them to relief under the Act if
proven. 84
Under the Conley reasoning, therefore, the question of whether a
plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts per se to support a claim is an
entirely irrelevant inquiry. As Judge Clark stated in a case that the
Court cited in Conley: "[T]here is no pleading requirement of stat-
ing 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' "' If a combi-
nation of facts and general allegations adequately identify a claim,
178. Id. at 47.
179. Id. (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 48.
181. Id. at 47 & n.9 (identifying motion for more definite statement, motion to strike,
motion for judgment on the pleadings, pre-trial conferences, discovery, motion for summary
judgment and amendment of pleadings).
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id. at 45-46.
184. Id. at 46.
185. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
[Vol. 31:935
PRESUMED FRIVOLOUS
then a claim is stated." 6 Legal, not factual, sufficiency is the only
issue properly challenged through a 12(b)(6) motion.'87
Use of the rule to apply a heightened pleading requirement con-
flicts directly with the intent of Rule 12(b)(6) and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Rule's function. Courts' and defend-
ants' use of the mechanism for this purpose, however, is not sur-
prising. The rules have no mechanism designed to serve the role of
assessing the validity of a claim's factual basis at the pleading
stage.
3. Alteration of the allocation of procedural responsibility
The procedural double standard created for civil rights actions
significantly alters the carefully balanced relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant. In the normal case, the plaintiff asserts a
claim based on her knowledge of the facts. To terminate the claim
before trial, the defendant may use primarily three procedural
mechanisms or techniques. First, the defendant may assert and es-
tablish an affirmative defense by means of an answer and disposi-
tive motion.' Second, the-defendant may prove, through a motion
for summary judgment and accompanying evidence, facts that de-
feat the plaintiff's claim. 89 Third, the defendant may establish,
through discovery followed by a motion for summary judgment,
that the plaintiff cannot prove facts sufficient to prevail on the
186. See United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 188 (1954) ("[M]ere
conclusions of the pleader ... must be taken into account."). The Court noted that addi-
tional facts could be obtained through a motion under Rule 12(e). Id. at 189.
187. In Leimer v. State Mut. Life, 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940), the court stated:
[T]he- making of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted has the effect of admitting the existence and
validity of the claim as stated, but challenges the right of the plaintiff to relief
thereunder.... [Flor instance, [when] a complaint states a claim based upon
a wrong for which there is no remedy,' or a claim which the plaintiff is without
right or power to assert and for which no relief could possibly be granted to
him, or a claim which the averments of the complaint show conclusively to be
barred by limitations.
Id. at 305-06 (8th Cir. 1940), cited with approval in Conley, 355 U.S. at 46 n.5. But see
Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) (case dismissed under 12(b)(6) for lack
of factual specificity).
188. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); id. 12(c)
(motion for judgment on the pleadings); id. 56 (motion for summary judgment).
189. Id. 56 (motion for summary judgment).
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claim.190 In each of the options, the burden of producing evidence
to accomplish termination rests with the defendant. The defendant
must convince the court of the lack of merit in the plaintiff's case.
As applied, the stringent pleading requirement alters this proce-
dural scheme as to the first and third options. Under the require-
ment, the plaintiff must convince the court of the case's merit, in-
stead of the defendant establishing its lack of merit. With regard
to the existence of an affirmative defense, for example, the plaintiff
must negate its existence through presentation of facts in the com-
plaint to avoid dismissal and proceed to discovery.19' Similarly, the
defendant need not pursue discovery and a motion for summary
judgment to challenge the plaintiff's ability to prove facts estab-
lishing the claim. The defendant need only file a motion to dismiss
on the basis that the complaint is not sufficiently specific, and the
plaintiff must come forward with facts to withstand the challenge.
In essence, the standard relieves the defendant of all obligations to
proceed with litigation and resolution of the dispute until the
plaintiff has established the claim's substantiality.
4. Specific language of the rules
Imposition of a higher pleading standard is not only contrary to
the structure and spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it
also conflicts with the rules' express language. When the drafters
intended to require greater pleading specificity, they included a
specific provision. Rule 9 sets forth a requirement that in certain
limited circumstances allegations must be specifically stated." 2 For
example, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity.9 9 Similarly, special pleading require-
ments are imposed in condemnation cases because of the unique
190. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
191. See Taylor v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 661 F. Supp. 1333, 1337, 1339 (N.D.
Tex. 1986).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (fraud or mistake); id. 9(c) (denial of occurrence or performance
of condition precedent); id. 9(g) (special damage). Commentators advance several reasons
for the various requirements. Foremost is the concept that greater specificity is necessary to
give fair notice in such cases. With regard to fraud, however, a primary reason is that courts
disfavor such suits. WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 25, § 1296, at 399-400. Such a rationale is
not applicable to statutorily based civil rights actions.
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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features necessary to adjudicate definitively such actions."' In
fact, the rules' drafters proposed, considered and rejected a num-
ber of additional applications of a particularity requirement, such
as patent and copyright cases.195 By negative implication, there-
fore, a heightened standard, particularly when applied to civil
rights cases, is contrary to the drafters' intent. 19 6
Moreover, even the Rule 9 particularity requirement is applied
with far less rigor than the heightened pleading standard. 9 ' For
example, the forms of Rule 84 contain an illustration of the factual
specificity required for a fraud claim. 9 ' According to Form 13, a
plaintiff alleges a claim of fraudulent conveyance with sufficient
"particularity" by simply stating that "Defendant C.D.... on or
about - conveyed all his property, .. to defendant E.F.. . . for
the purpose of defrauding plaintiff.' 99 Such "particularity" falls
far short of providing a court with enough facts to assess the valid-
ity of the claim, as required under the civil rights pleading
requirement.
Because adoption of a special pleading rule conflicts with the
federal rules' directives, a number of judges have appropriately
criticized such action as "judicial legislation."200 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a)(2), "govern the procedure
in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature."20'
Under the Rules Enabling Act,20 2 the power to promulgate and
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resides exclusively
194. Id. 71(A)(c).
195. See Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 48.
196. See id. at 48-49 (discussing pressure to impose stricter pleading requirements in
"big" cases such as antitrust actions). Judge Clark stated: "Now it is clear that in federal
pleading no special exceptions have been created for the 'Big Case' or any other particular
type of action." Id. at 48; see Thompson v. Village of Evergreen Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252
(N.D. Il. 1980) (making point of negative implication).
197. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1291, at 389 (Rule 9 must be read in con-
junction with Rule 8 and "should not be construed strictly.").
198. See supra note 55 (discussing Rule 84).
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (Form 13).
200. Thompson, 503 F. Supp. at 252; see Wingate, supra note 17, at 692 ("[T]he judicial
development of a strict pleading standard in civil rights cases is inappropriate."); see also
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
("[A] fact pleading requirement [is] at variance with that approved by Congress in Rule 8,
Fed. R. Civ. P.").
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
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with Congress upon recommendation of the Supreme Court. The
standard, particularly as applied, represents an attempt to accom-
plish implicitly what the courts cannot do explicitly: The courts
have no power to adopt procedural rules that conflict with the fed-
eral rules.203
B. Civil Rights Statutes
Quite apart from the courts' power, or lack thereof, to adopt a
unique rule of pleading, the application of such a rule in civil
rights cases is particularly problematic. The remedial nature of the
civil rights statutes mandate liberal interpretation and applica-
tion20 4 "to effectuate the high congressional priority placed upon
the vindication of civil rights' deprivations. ' 20 5 The Supreme Court
has stated that the civil rights statutes must be accorded "a sweep
as broad as [their] language."20 As a result, courts have a duty to
"be especially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs" in the application
of procedural rules.207
Utilizing the stringent standard of pleading conflicts directly
with the legislative judgment embodied in the statutes. First, the
standard impermissibly discriminates against the very federal
rights that Congress has indicated should be afforded generous
203. See Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (striking down a local
district court rule requiring plaintiff in a § 1983 action to demonstrate good cause before
being permitted to conduct discovery because such a rule conflicts directly with federal
rules). Judge Higginbotham, however, has taken the position that the stringent standard, at
least as applied in cases involving immunity defenses, is not judicial legislation. He has
argued instead that it is simply judicial interpretation-the courts' effort to define the word
"claim" in the specific context of a case involving official immunity. Elliott v. Perez, 751
F.2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Unfortunately, Judge Hig-
ginbotham failed to recognize that the basic purpose of the stringent standard conflicts di-
rectly with the intent of the rules.
204. Schorle v. City of Greenhills, 524 F. Supp. 821, 825 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Nanez v. Rit-
ger, 304 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
205. Canty v. City of Richmond, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (E.D. Va. 1974), af'd, 526 F.2d
587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976).
206. Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988) (citation omitted).
207. Canty, 383 F. Supp. at 1399 (holding that civil rights complaints must be construed
broadly because of the importance of the interests at stake); see Bonner v. Circuit Court,
526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976) (holding that court has
duty to examine complaint to determine if relief is available under any theory).
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treatment. 08 The heightened requirement applies only to plaintiffs
alleging constitutional and statutory violations; all other plaintiffs
need comply only with the liberal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).209
Second, and more important, the heightened standard potentially
operates to obscure meritorious cases and prevent vindication and
deterrence of constitutional violations. As discussed earlier, for ex-
ample, a court may dismiss a plaintiff's claim for failing to allege
supporting facts that may be available to the plaintiff only after
discovery.210 On a more fundamental level, the strict pleading stan-
dard operates to minimize the liability of governmental defend-
ants, particularly in cases implicating immunity defenses-an ob-
jective "manifestly inconsistent" with the purposes of section 1983
of Title 42.211
C. Treatment of Pro Se Litigants
The conflict between the strict pleading requirement and the
policies contained in bbth the federal rules and the civil rights
statutes is significantly exacerbated by the requirement's applica-
tion to pro se litigants. Available data indicate that the majority of
civil rights actions are filed without the aid of counsel.212 Pro se
litigants, however, are traditionally afforded great latitude in com-
plying with procedural rules. In fact, courts have an affirmative
208. Cf. Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2308 (holding that state notice of claim statute discriminates
against federal right and, therefore, is preempted).
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("A pleading... shall contain... a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.").
210. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
211. Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2308 (rejecting state's attempt to minimize governmental liabil-
ity through notice of claim requirement).
212. For example, pro se plaintiffs fied over 90% of the civil rights actions terminated in
the District of Arizona during 1987. With regard to actions brought by prisoners, which
constituted 93% of those actions, over 97% were litigated pro se. Of the nonprisoner cases,
49% were pursued pro se. The raw data are on file with the author.
The data are based on a review of the docket entries for all cases terminated during calen-
dar year 1987 in the district for two categories of cases: prisoner civil rights and other civil
rights. The latter category includes primarily constitutional tort cases brought under § 1983.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts' codes for those cases are 550 and
440, respectively. For a detailed review of the data compilation procedures and codes used
by the federal courts, see Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 2, at 660-65. The District of
Arizona graciously provided a computer generated list of the terminated cases in 1987 for
those categories. The docket entries for 758 cases were reviewed.
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duty to apprise pro se litigants of potentially dispositive proce-
dural requirements, such as those involved in responding to a mo-
tion for summary judgment.213
This protective attitude in the pleading context is derived from
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Haines v. Kerner.214 In
Haines, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal
of a pro se inmate's section 1983 complaint as inconsistent with the
Conley standard,215 stating that it appears "beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief. '216 In applying the standard, the Court
further stated that the allegations of a pro se complaint should be
held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.121 7 Pro se complaints, therefore, are to be construed liber-
ally in applying the already generous Conley standard.218 Although
Haines involved a prisoner plaintiff, courts regularly have applied
the standard to nonprisoner pro se parties.219
The policy underlying this paternalistic approach, free and open
access to the judicial system,220 is reflected in the simple pleading
requirements of the federal rules. As Judge Clark commented
within that context: "I think it's a sound philosophical approach to
213. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[C]ourts have a duty to
ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their case
due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements," for example, notice of summary
judgment procedures.).
214. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
215. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
216. Haines, 404 U.S. at 521.
217. Id. at 520. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the standard. See, e.g., Boag v. Mac-
Dougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1977).
218. Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1981) (pro se complaint liberally
construed in applying Conley test).
219. See, e.g., Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 (11th Cir. 1987) (§ 1983 action based on
unlawful search of home); Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1980) (§ 1983
action against university police); Cheek v. Doe, 110 F.R.D. 420, 421 (N.D. Ill.) (tax pro-
tester's constitutional challenge to income tax), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 395
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 955 (1987).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982) (stating that "parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally"); Mullen v. Starr, 537 F. Supp. 945, 947-49 (W.D. Mo.) (discussing treat-
ment afforded pro se plaintiff and stating that "[f]ree access to the courts is a keystone of




say that in this stage of coming to the courts we allow any preson
[sic] to come in and put his claim before the judge. We don't want
to establish rules with which only the highest grade counsel can
comply."'22' Consistent with this philosophy, the liberal approach
to such litigants is not limited solely to evaluation of pleadings.22
Under Haines and the spirit of the federal rules, therefore, any
heightened pleading requirement should not apply to pro se com-
plaints. Indeed, the nature of pro se complaints only magnifies the
incongruity of attempting to assess the merit of an action solely
through the pleadings. As Justice Stevens stated:
The reasons for the Haines test are manifest. A pro se com-
plaint provides an unsatisfactory foundation for deciding the
merits of important questions because typically it is inartfully
drawn, unclear, and equivocal, and because thorough pleadings,
affidavits, and possibly an evidentiary hearing will usually bring
out facts which simplify or make unnecessary the decision of
questions presented by the naked complaint.223
Moreover, the societal value placed on the interests at stake ren-
ders application of the Haines standard even more compelling in
civil rights cases.224
For these reasons, a few courts have expressly refused to apply
the stringent standard to civil rights complaints of unrepresented
plaintiffs,225 while several others have applied the Haines/Conley
standard without comment in such cases. 26 Yet, a significant num-
ber of courts have applied the stringent standard to pro se plain-
221. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 41, at 188. Judge Clark further
noted that "for years Senator Walsh. . . held up the passage of the Enabling Act for the
Federal Rules, with the reiterated complaint that this was an attempt of high-priced counsel
to force their own absolute requirements on country lawyers." Id.
222. See Mullen, 537 F. Supp. at 948-49 (using a liberal approach in evaluating summary
judgment motion).
223. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
224. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
225. See Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1981) (reversing district
court's dismissal of pro se claim for not meeting the stringent standard in municipal liability
case); McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F. Supp. 117, 118-20 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that a state
prisoner could proceed on his complaint despite the fact that his complaint contained no
specific allegations of defendants' participation in, or knowledge of, the alleged misconduct).
226. See Morales v. New York Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988);
Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1981).
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227tiffs in general, ignoring the directives of Haines, or giving its
language only superficial acknowledgement.228
Only the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with character-
istic candor, has expressly recognized and attempted to resolve the
inherent conflict between Haines and applying the strict standard
to pro se plaintiffs. The seminal Third Circuit pre-Haines author-
ity for a strict pleading requirement, Negrich v. Hohn,229
originated from the civil rights complaint of a pro se inmate. 3
The inmate asserted a claim of cruel and unusual punishment
while in pre-trial custody. 31 In support of the claim, he alleged
that he had been repeatedly beaten, forced to sign a statement im-
plicating himself in a prison break, provided only bread and water,
placed in solitary confinement on a restricted diet, and denied the
right to see his attorney.232 The court in Negrich dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that such allegations were "broad and
conclusory. ' '2 33
Following Haines, the Third Circuit made a superficial attempt
to reconcile the Supreme Court's holding and the Negrich decision.
In Gray v. Creamer,23 4 the court reversed dismissal of a complaint
that a group of represented inmates had filed, reasoning that the
existence of "at least some" specific allegations rendered the
Negrich procedure inapplicable. 2 5 The court further commented
that it had "no reason to believe" that Negrich was inconsistent
with Haines because the plaintiff in Haines "made specific allega-
227. Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1987); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643
(7th Cir. 1982).
228. Wiggins v. New Mexico Supreme Court, 664 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982); DeFerro v. Coco, 709 F. Supp. 643, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Town-
send v. Frame, 587 F. Supp. 369, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
229. 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
230. The court in Negrich did not consider affording the pro se complaint any special
treatment, perhaps in part because the plaintiff was represented by appointed counsel on
appeal. Id. at 215 n.4. A subsequent pre-Haines Third Circuit panel, however, acknowledged
that pro se litigants should not be "denied the opportunity to state a civil rights claim
because of technicalities." Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 846 (1970). The court resolved the competing policies by providing the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend the complaint. Id.
231. Negrich, 379 F.2d at 214.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 215.
234. 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972).
235. Id. at 182 n.2.
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tions of unconstitutional conduct."2 ' Any distinction between the
degree of specificity alleged in the two cases, however, is illusory.
To the contrary, the allegations in both cases were remarkably
similar in nature and scope. 237
The Third Circuit subsequently concluded that the distinction
drawn by the Gray court, however tenuous, "harmonized" Negrich
and Haines.38 In Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, the court held
that pursuant to Gray "the Haines standard would be applied to
complaints in which 'specific allegations of unconstitutional con-
duct' were made, whereas Negrich would continue to serve as a
barrier to complaints which 'contain only vague and conclusory
allegations.' ,239
The "harmony" achieved, however, is discordant and a direct re-
flection of the inconsistent results in the two cases. The bifurcated
standard emasculates the protection afforded pro se litigants under
Haines by imposing a threshold specificity requirement on its ap-
plication. The end result is unchanged by Haines: In civil rights
actions, pro se plaintiffs must meet a stricter standard of pleading
than the standard that the federal rules impose.
Townsend v. Frame240 illustrates the point well. In Townsend, a
pro se inmate plaintiff alleged that on a specific day he was
"punched in the face" by a prison guard.241 The complaint further
stated that despite a report to prison administrators, "[t]he prob-
lem continued. '2 2 Applying. the test articulated in Rotolo, the
court dismissed the claim for lack of the specificity needed to es-
tablish a viable civil rights claim.2 43 The complaint, according to
the court, was deficient in that it failed to set forth the circum-
stances surrounding the incident and what transpired thereafter."
236. Id.
237. Like Mr. Negrich, the plaintiff in Haines asserted a claim of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment arising out of detention in solitary confinement. Id. at 181-83. Haines alleged that a
foot disability caused the confinement to be unconstitutionally cruel and imposed without
due process. Haines v. Kerner, 427 F.2d 71, 72 (7th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
238. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976).
239. Id. (quoting Gray, 465 F.2d at 182 n.2).
240. 587 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
241. Id. at 370.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 371.
244. Id. The court further stated:
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The court's holding, while consistent with Negrich, represents a
complete disregard of the Haines test. Even ignoring the fact that
the plaintiff appeared pro se, under existing precedent it is impos-
sible to conclude "beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.124
The conflict between applying a strict pleading requirement to
pro se litigants and the holding in Haines arises from the tension
between the purpose of each. The Haines standard ensures that
procedural technicalities do not deny pro se litigants the opportu-
nity to pursue vindication of constitutional and statutory depriva-
tions, such as ensuring that resolution of the merits does not occur
at the pleading stage. In contrast, the heightened pleading stan-
dard is designed expressly to terminate cases through stringent
procedural requirements at the pleading stage. Any attempt to re-
solve this conflict fails.
IV. NECESSITY FOR A STRINGENT PLEADING STANDARD
Is it not wiser to use to the full these highly practical devices
than once again to pursue the phantom of pleading
certainty?246
The heightened pleading rule has one primary objective: identi-
fying and terminating frivolous actions as early as possible in the
litigation process. As discussed below, however, numerous alterna-
tive procedural mechanisms designed specifically to accomplish
this objective are available to both courts and defendants. Also
available are other devices that assist indirectly in reducing the
burden on courts and defendants. Before examining those alterna-
[P]laintiff gives no indication as to whether [the guard's] actions were either
unprovoked or, contrarily, related to jail discipline. If the latter, it is not al-
leged that the amount of force used by [the guard] was improper under the
circumstances. Plaintiff does not allege the extent or severity of his injuries, if
any. In addition, he does not indicate whether [the guard's] conduct was part
of a pattern or routine of physical abuse ....
Id.
245. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44 (1957); see, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1030-31 (2d Cir.) (and cases cited therein) (holding that unprovoked attack by state prison
guard constitutes § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
246. Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 52.
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tive mechanisms, I will examine the issue of the magnitude of that
burden.
A. Burden on Courts and Defendants
Two points generally are made with reference to the alleged bur-
den that civil rights litigation imposes on courts and defendants.
Both are at least superficially supportable. First, the heavy volume
of such litigation is undeniable.24 Second, the frivolous nature of a
large number of such cases is also, at least anecdotally, supporta-
ble.248 A stringent pleading standard is not designed to reduce the
volume of frivolous complaints themselves. Instead, the require-
ment operates to reduce the burden created by the process of
resolving and disposing of such cases.
A true assessment of the resulting "burden" as it relates to the
pleading requirement, therefore, requires an examination of how
the process of litigating the actions actually affects the courts and
defendants. At least one study suggests that the impact is much
less than perceived.249 The majority of civil rights actions are filed
by prisoners.25 0 According to the study, defendants never even an-
swer more than two-thirds of prisoner civil rights complaints. 251
Few inmate plaintiffs, less than ten percent, request discovery and
even fewer successfully obtain it. 252 Seldom, if ever, are the cases
actually tried.25 3 The percentage of cases appealed is also remarka-
bly small, generally less than ten percent.254
247. See Doumar, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing the "deluge" of § 1983 cases); see also
1987 Annual Report 182 (reporting number of civil rights cases commenced in U.S. district
courts between 1983 and 1987).
248. See supra notes 12-13. In addition, as discussed infra note 280, almost 70% of pris-
oner civil rights cases are dismissed as frivolous under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Turner, supra note 16, at 618. But see Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 927
(3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (questioning the empirical validity of the majority's
characterization of civil rights litigation as "burdensome, vexatious, and largely
unfounded").
249. Doumar, supra note 7.
250. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
251. See Turner, supra note 16, at 618.
252. Id. at 662.
253. Id. at 661.
254. Id. at 661-63 (statistical analysis of cases in five selected districts). None of the five
districts apply the stringent pleading standard.
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A review of all civil rights actions terminated in the District of
Arizona during the calendar year 1987 produced similar results.2 55
More than one-third of the complaints in the 758 cases reviewed
were never served on the defendants.2 56 Discovery occurred in
slightly more than ten percent of the actions.2 7 Almost half of the
cases were terminated by the grant of a dispositive motion, such as
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.258 Only
three percent of the cases proceeded to trial, and less than one per-
cent in the case of prisoner suits. 2519
An exhaustive empirical assessment of the nature and extent of
the burden that the civil rights litigation created is beyond the
scope of this Article, but even this brief examination of the issue
suggests that the burden is exaggerated.
B. Alternative Procedural Mechanisms
1. 28 U.S.C. section 1915 review
The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1915,
permits indigent individuals to pursue litigation despite their in-
ability to pay the lawsuit's costs. 260 Congress realized, however,
that permitting plaintiffs to proceed without payment reduces the
economic incentive that operates on paying litigants to refrain
255. The source of the data and the method of analysis are discussed supra note 212. The
district does not employ a heightened pleading requirement.
256. In prisoner cases, 38% were not served. In nonprisoner cases, only 8% of the com-
plaints were not served.
257. Discovery occurred in almost half (47%) of the nonprisoner cases. Prisoner case liti-
gants, however, engaged in discovery in only 7.5% of the suits. The low percentage for both
cases reflects the much larger volume of prisoner cases than nonprisoner cases.
258. The grant of motions for summary judgment terminated 28% of prisoner cases and
19% of nonprisoner cases. The grant of motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) termi-
nated 18% of prisoner cases and 30% of nonprisoner cases.
259. According to data from the Administrative Office, 5.4% of all cases nationally pro-
ceeded to trial in statistical year 1987. See 1987 Annual Report 213 (reporting total number
of cases terminated and the number terminated by trial of the action).
260. The statute states in pertinent part: "Any court of the United States may authorize
the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal,. . . without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes




from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive suits.2 61 To prevent
such abusive litigation, the statute further provides that a court
may dismiss an action filed under its authority "if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious. 2 62 Courts sua sponte routinely
dismiss these actions on such grounds before the issuance of
process.263
A significant portion of civil rights actions are filed in forma
264pauperis. This is particularly true of prisoner cases, which, as
noted earlier, constitute the majority of civil rights cases.265 In fact,
available data indicate that, nationally, much more than eighty
percent of prisoner civil rights complaints are filed pursuant to sec-
tion 1915 of Title 28.266 Of cases terminated in 1987 in the District
of Arizona, eighty-six percent of prisoner civil rights actions, and
eighty percent of all civil rights cases, had been filed pursuant to
the statute.267 The majority of civil rights complaints are thus al-
ready subject to review for frivolity at the outset.
The Supreme Court recently examined the standard applicable
to a determination of frivolity under section 1915. In Neitzke v.
Williams,2 8 a unanimous Court affirmed the reversal of the dis-
trict court's dismissal of an inmate's section 1983 claim. The Court
stated that a complaint is frivolous under section 1915 of Title 28
"where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. '26 9 The
Court further explained: "[T]he statute accords judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose fac-
tual contentions are clearly baseless. ' 270 According to the Court, a
261. Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1982).
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
263. Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. at 1831.
264. See Doumar, supra note 7, at 27 ("A great number of prisoners seek in forma
pauperis status when filing civil rights suits.").
265. See supra note 7.
266. See Turner, supra note 16, at 617 (analysis of cases in five districts disclosed that
the percentage of prisoner cases filed under § 1915 ranged from 85% to 95%).
267. See supra note 212 (discussing data source).
268. 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989).
269. Id. at 1831.
270. Id. at 1833.
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case against a defendant entitled to absolute immunity is an exam-
ple of a meritless legal claim subject to dismissal under the stat-
ute. 1 Claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios exem-
plify baseless factual contentions. 27 1
In rendering its decision, the Court also resolved a longstanding
dispute among the circuits regarding the relationship between the
standards for dismissal under section 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6). A
number of circuits had adopted the position that a complaint that
failed to state a claim under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard was sub-
ject to dismissal automatically under section 1915. In rejecting
this position, the Court acknowledged that although the two stan-
dards overlap significantly, the purposes of the two mechanisms
differ .2 4 Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to allow courts to dismiss claims
on the basis of dispositive issues of law. 7 5 Section 1915 is intended
to replicate the function of screening out unsupportable claims-a
function the cost of bringing suit and the threat of financial sanc-
tions normally perform. 6 Thus, under Rule 12(b)(6) a court may
properly dismiss a claim based on a finding that the plaintiff lacks
an arguable legal theory.17 With regard to issues of law, section
1915 limits dismissals to wholly baseless legal claims; arguable
claims, however unavailing, are not subject to dismissal. More-
over, to achieve its screening function section 1915 permits a court
to evaluate the factual allegations and dismiss those that are base-
less. In contrast, a judge's disbelief of a plaintiff's factual allega-
tions cannot justify dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).79
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1832.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1832-33.
277. Id. at 1833.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1832. The Court also noted that conflating the two standards would result in
unequal treatment of paying and nonpaying litigants. A court normally would dismiss the
complaint of a paying plaintiff only after a defendant filed a motion setting forth the argu-
ments for dismissal to which the plaintiff could respond. A court could dismiss sua sponte,
however, the complaint of a nonpaying plaintiff and thereby deny the plaintiff, without the




Courts dispose of a high proportion of prisoner civil rights cases
through section 1915's initial review before issuance of process.28
Jurisdictions vary in the procedures and personnel used. For exam-
ple, in the Districts of Arizona and Oregon, law clerks review each
complaint filed pursuant to section 1915 and make recommenda-
tions to the assigned judge or magistrate regarding appropriate dis-
position.28' Courts also have developed procedures to gather addi-
tional information perceived necessary to make a reasoned frivolity
determination. For example, courts have: required prison authori-
ties to investigate and report to the court; required the state's at-
torney general to undertake a similar procedure; used form com-
plaints; and required plaintiffs to complete questionnaires that the
court propounded." 2
Courts thus have an extremely powerful mechanism available
that is specifically designed to achieve the primary objective of a
strict pleading standard-early termination of frivolous claims.
Moreover, this mechanism affords defendants more protection
than the pleading requirement because it operates to terminate
such claims pre-service. Although not available in all civil rights
actions, the screening mechanism of section 1915 is applicable to a
large number of the cases perceived to be the most problem-
atic-indigent prisoner lawsuits.
280. For example, in 1976 approximately 70% of civil rights actions filed by inmates were
dismissed as a result of initial review under § 1915. Turner, supra note 16, at 618. The
District of Arizona dismisses a smaller proportion of cases under § 1915. In 1987, the court
dismissed 38% of prisoner cases under the authority of § 1915. The court did not dismiss
any nonprisoner civil rights actions pursuant to the statute. See supra note 212 (discussing
source of data).
281. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1334 n.24 (D. Or. 1983). Notes from an
interview with the "pro se" clerks in the District of Arizona regarding the procedure are on
file with the author.
282. See Martinez v. Chavez, 574 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.4 (10th Cir. 1978); Watson v. Ault,
525 F.2d 886, 892-98 (5th Cir. 1976). Arguably, some of these procedures are subject to
criticism similar to that leveled against applying a heightened pleading standard. In contrast
to the pleading standard, however, the procedures have been developed and utilized pursu-
ant to general statutory authority.
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2. Summary judgment
Summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56283 is the primary mech-
anism for eliminating meritless claims before trial under the fed-
eral rules.2 84 As Chief Justice Rehnquist recently remarked:
Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the Fed-
eral Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense
were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or
defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial
with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and pri-
vate resources. But with the advent of "notice pleading," the
motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its
place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment.15
Perhaps in recognition of its vital function, the Supreme Court re-
cently has demonstrated significant enthusiasm for increasing the
role of summary judgment in the litigation process.2 8 As a result,
summary judgment arguably has become an even more effective
method of disposing of meritless claims pre-trial.
28 7
The moving party bears an initial burden of "production" to es-
tablish a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment.
The moving party must show that the material facts are undis-
puted and under the applicable law those facts render judgment
appropriate. 88 The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with
the party who would bear it at trial. If the moving party has the
burden of persuasion, that party must support the motion with
283. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
284. Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 49 (citing United States v. Employing
Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954)).
285. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
286. See id. at 327 (Rule 56 construed with due regard for persons defending claims that
have no factual basis). See generally Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Re-
cent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REV. LITIGATION 263 (1987).
287. See Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with
Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv. LrrMGATION 227, 251-
52 (1987).
288. If the motion fails initially to establish a prima facie case, the motion must be de-
nied. The Supreme Court has closely equated the standard for summary judgment and the
standard for directed verdict. As articulated by the Court, the basic test is whether the
evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could find for the party opposing summary
judgment. If so, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986).
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credible evidence establishing entitlement to judgment. The other
party then must counter with evidence to establish the existence of
a material factual dispute."s" If, however, the nonmoving party
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, the moving party must
either present evidence negating an essential element of the other
party's claim or otherwise demonstrate that the other party lacks
evidence to support its claim.2 90 In either situation, to withstand
the motion the nonmoving party must come forward with credible
evidence establishing the existence of contrary facts.29'
Proper use of the summary judgment process provides civil
rights defendants with a simple, effective and relatively inexpen-
sive method of terminating cases that lack a sufficient factual ba-
sis. Discovery, of course, often plays an important role. Necessary
discovery, however, need not be unduly time consuming or costly.
For example, in an action in which a plaintiff alleges a conspiracy
or a municipal policy, defendants can simply serve interrogatories
asking the plaintiff to disclose all facts that support the claim. If
the claim lacks factual support, the response should disclose the
deficiency," 2 and the defendants may move successfully for sum-
mary judgment. Alternatively, any facts disclosed may fail to es-
tablish a civil rights violation as a matter of substantive law,
thereby entitling defendants to summary judgment.
In some cases discovery may not even be necessary. For example,
in cases implicating immunity defenses a defendant can simply
move for summary judgment based on his own affidavit, setting
forth facts surrounding the occurrence at issue. Unless the plaintiff
289. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment on the basis that material facts
are in dispute "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's
pleading, but... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Or, of course, the opposing party could argue that the movant's appli-
cation of the law is wrong.
290. Exactly what is required to "otherwise demonstrate" that the other party lacks suffi-
cient evidence to support its claim remains somewhat unclear. Both the plurality opinion
and Justice White's concurrence in Celotex suggest that at a minimum the lack of such
evidence must be apparent in the discovery record. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325, 328 (1986).
291. Id. at 330-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority's allocation of bur-
dens, but disagreeing with the application).
292. If the plaintiff fails to respond, sanctions including dismissal are available under FED.
PR Civ. P. 37.
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provides sufficient credible evidence to establish a material factual
dispute, summary judgment would be appropriate.1 3
Applying a stringent pleading requirement is less effective in
achieving this result fairly. First, and most importantly, summary
judgment terminates cases based on a review of the merits. In con-
trast, termination for noncompliance with stringent pleading re-
quirements creates the risk of precluding vindication of meritori-
ous claims." 4 Second, a properly used summary judgment operates
to terminate all factually deficient claims, not just those that are
wholly frivolous. Third, one objective of the pleading standard is
disclosure of facts sufficient to permit the defendant to pursue
summary judgment. Discovery requests, however, can be far more
specific and, therefore, more effective than a generally applicable
pleading requirement in securing the factual detail, or lack thereof,
necessary to support a motion. Fourth, inevitable delays are built
into use of the pleading standard as a means of dismissal. Before
dismissal for deficient pleading, the plaintiff normally is afforded
at least one opportunity to amend the complaint.29 5 Both the stan-
dard and summary judgment, therefore, require some expenditure
of the courts' and the parties' time.296
293. See Marsh v. Barry, 824 F.2d 1139, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that affidavits of
defendants established the reasonableness of their conduct); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020,
1025-26 (8th Cir.) (holding that affidavits of defendants established lack of reckless disre-
gard for plaintiffs' rights), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984).
294. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
296. Nor does the existence of Rule 56(f) seriously undermine or inappropriately delay
effective use of summary judgment. Rule 56(f) provides that a party faced with a motion for
summary judgment may request a continuance of its consideration to permit the nonmoving
party to engage in discovery or secure affidavits necessary to oppose the motion. FED. R. CIv.
P. 56(f). Application of the rule, however, is somewhat limited. First, the party requesting
additional time under Rule 56(f) must explain satisfactorily her failure to obtain the mate-
rial previously or complete discovery. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2741, at 541.
Second, the requesting party must describe the nature of the requested discovery and its
relevance to genuine issues of material fact. See Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d
177, 184 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). "The nonmovant may not simply
rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified,
facts." SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981). Third, the court may limit the scope and the time
allowed for such discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Operation of the rule, therefore, is limited
to circumstances in which it is truly warranted. For example, courts should always permit
discovery prior to judgment or dismissal in cases in which the relevant facts are in the con-
trol of the opposing party, as is often the case for civil rights plaintiffs. Nor does the pur-
PRESUMED FRIVOLOUS
Summary judgment, in tandem with discovery, thus provides an
extremely effective mechanism for identifying and disposing of
frivolous and factually unsupported civil rights actions.
3. Other provisions of the federal rules
Although summary judgment is the principal device in the fed-
eral rules for pre-trial termination of meritless claims, other rule
provisions provide mechanisms that can play a similar role.
a. Rule 12(b)
Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of an action when the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.9 7 Such a dismissal normally is
made upon motion by the defendant. 98 Because existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction implicates the court's very power to enter-
tain the suit, however, a court also may dismiss the action under
12(b)(1) sua sponte before issuance of service. 99
As a threshold matter, claims brought under the civil rights stat-
utes fall within federal courts' federal question jurisdiction.300
Courts, however, have added a requirement that the federal aspect
of the claim be "substantial. ' 30 1 Although the Supreme Court has
questioned the analytical soundness of the doctrine, it has stated:
"[T]he federal courts are without power to entertain claims other-
wise within their jurisdiction if they are 'so attenuated and unsub-
stantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,' 'wholly insubstantial,'
pose of the qualified immunity doctrine justify a different result. Courts certainly may limit
such discovery exclusively to the immunity issue. See Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't
812 F.2d 1425, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
297. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
298. Id. 12(b) (stating that defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made by
motion).
299. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming sua sponte
dismissal under 12(b)(1) of non-indigent plaintiff's § 1983 complaint before issuance of pro-
cess). The court noted that such a dismissal lacks the procedural protections of the normal
adversarial process. However, the fact that such dismissals are not adjudications of the mer-
its and, therefore, do not preclude further litigation of the claim, mitigates the problem. Id.
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (conferring federal question jurisdiction). The civil
rights statutes, such as § 1983, do not independently create a basis of jurisdiction. Other
statutes, such as § 1331, must confer jurisdiction. See id. § 1343(3) (conferring jurisdiction
over deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law).
301. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974).
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'obviously frivolous,' 'plainly insubstantial,' or 'no longer open to
discussion.' "302 The inquiry is purely legal, however, because the
court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true. 03 Al-
though similar to Rule 12(b)(6) in terms of the nature of the in-
quiry, the examination of legal sufficiency under 12(b)(1) is much
less searching than that conducted in determining whether a claim
has been stated.0 4
Applying the insubstantiality doctrine, courts have used dismis-
sals under Rule 12(b)(1) to terminate patently frivolous civil rights
actions. Moreover, the doctrine applies to all cases, not only those
filed in forma pauperis. For example, in Franklin v. Oregon,305 the
court reviewed the dismissal of thirty-three complaints that had
been refiled, fee-paid, after initial dismissals under section 1915.301
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
twenty-two of the actions, pre-service, under the authority of Rule
12(b) (1).3 7 The insubstantial actions included claims that the state
welfare agency caused Franklin's divorce by providing benefits to
his wife, that the prison clinic took twelve X-rays when two would
have sufficed, and that prison officials refused to replace his year-
old t-shirts.30 8
As discussed previously, Rule 12(b)(6) challenges for failure to
state a claim address exclusively the issue of the asserted claim's
legal sufficiency.309 All allegations of the complaint are treated as
true, regardless of the court's belief in their veracity.310 A motion
302. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
303. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Curiously, however, the Supreme
Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989), appears to have suggested otherwise.
After stating that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal cannot be "based on a judge's disbelief of a
complaint's factual allegations," the opinion indicated that a dismissal on such grounds
might be appropriate under the insubstantiality doctrine. Id. at 1832 & n.6.
304. See Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Stat-
ute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 413, 416-17 (1985). For example, a court
would not properly dismiss a completely novel legal theory under 12(b)(1), but could dismiss
it under 12(b)(6) if the court rejected the theory. Id.
305. 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981). The legendary Harry Franklin brought these actions.
See supra note 13.
306. 662 F.2d at 1340.
307. Id. at 1348.
308. Id. at 1343-45.
309. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
310. Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989).
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by the defendant is the primary mechanism for initiating a dismis-
sal under 12(b)(6). Courts' dismissals sua sponte are strongly dis-
favored because they lack the procedural protections inherent in
the adversarial process.31' In fact, some courts have expressly re-
jected use of such dismissals, particularly before service of the
complaint.3 12
Although limited in its scope of application, Rule 12(b)(6) pro-
vides an effective mechanism for disposing of certain meritless
cases early in the litigation process. Dismissal is certainly appropri-
ate in cases involving claims that are not legally cognizable, that
include facts that are legally dispositive, or that assert novel legal
theories that the court rejects. In the civil rights context, for exam-
ple, courts could properly dismiss a claim if the defendant was en-
titled to absolute immunity,313 the complaint disclosed that the
statute of limitations had run,314 or the claim involved the negli-
gent deprivation of property without due process.31 5 In such cases,
the burden of the litigation on the court and defendant is elimi-
nated early in the process.
b. Rule 16
Rule 16 affords federal courts a significant degree of authority to
control and manage the litigation process. 16 Although this rule
does not provide a direct mechanism for identifying and terminat-
ing meritless cases, properly exercised the rule can meaningfully
311. In Neitzke, for example, the Supreme Court discussed the problems created by sua
sponte action. Id. at 1833-34. The Court, however, expressly declined to address the "per-
missible scope, if any," of the practice. Id. at 1834 n.8. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), the Court reversed and remanded the sua sponte dismissal under 12(b)(6) without
commenting on that procedural aspect of the case. Id. at 108. In dissent, however, Justice
Stevens noted that the Court's disposition of the case should not be taken as an "endorse-
ment of th[e] practice since the question was not raised by the parties." Id. at 112 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1341-42.
313. See Green v. Marao, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir. 1983) (12(b)(6) dismissal of § 1983
claim due to existence of absolute judicial immunity).
314. See Vitale v. Nuzzo, 674 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D. Conn. 1986) (12(b)(6) dismissal of
§ 1983 complaint due to running of statute of limitations).
315. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (holding that negligent deprivation of
property without due process does not state a claim under § 1983).
316. Courts also retain inherent authority to control and manage the pre-trial process.
See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989).
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expedite resolution of cases. As a result, the litigation burden on
the courts and defendants can be substantially reduced.
The rule contains two primary procedures to accomplish this
purpose. First, the rule provides that the judge shall enter a sched-
uling order establishing time limits for amending pleadings, com-
pleting discovery, and filing and hearing motions.3 17 The judge also
may establish a time for a pre-trial conference and trial. 18 Second,
the rule provides that the court may hold a pre-trial conference to
address, among other things, simplification of the issues and elimi-
nation of frivolous claims, stipulations and admissions of the par-
ties, identification of witnesses and exhibits, and settlement.3 19
Both procedures can be utilized effectively to achieve timely reso-
lution of all actions, particularly those that lack merit.
For example, orders under Rule 16 can direct and limit discovery
to reduce its burden by allowing it to proceed solely under the par-
ties' control. Courts also can establish a tight schedule for pre-trial
activity, followed by an immediate trial date. Such a procedure can
be effective particularly in cases in which summary judgment is
not appropriate due to factual disputes. For example, in a case
that an inmate filed in the District of Arizona, immediately after
denying the state's motion for summary judgment, the judge set
the case for trial three months later-at the prison.32 0 Trial oc-
curred, and the court entered judgment for the defendants only
five months after they had filed their answer.2 1 Moreover, holding
trial at the prison reduced the burden of trial for the defendant
prison officials.
Additionally, most courts require that the parties file a pre-trial
statement prior to a pre-trial conference.2 2 Such statements must
include the parties' theories of the case, undisputed factual and
legal issues, and disputed factual and legal issues. 23 As a result,
317. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
318. Id.
319. Id. 16(c).
320. See Marks v. Kennedy, No. 83 Civ. 1344 (D. Ariz. July 21, 1987) (docket sheet on file
with clerk).
321. See id.; see also Beatty v. Phipps, No. 82 Civ. 1159 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 1987) (same
basic procedure).




the court is provided the opportunity at conference to narrow is-
sues and weed out frivolous claims. Moreover, the process itself po-
tentially serves the same purpose for the parties. Finally, failure to
comply with the requirements or any pre-trial orders can result in
dismissal. 24
Most importantly, this process permits resolution of the process
on the merits, something pleading requirements are functionally
less capable of accomplishing. As Judge Clark remarked: "Affirma-
tively a pre-trial order-if the judge is competent and effec-
tive-settles facts, plans and programs for the future course of a




Deterring factually unsupported claims also can reduce the bur-
den on the courts and defendants. The most common deterrent is
the imposition of monetary sanctions upon the party and/or the
attorney responsible for advancing the frivolous litigation. The fed-
eral courts have available several sources of authority for sanc-
tions.32 6 Rule 11, however, is most frequently used to sanction the
assertion of frivolous claims. 27
Rule 11 provides, in part, that the signature of an attorney or
party constitutes certification that the pleading is, to the best of
that person's knowledge "after reasonable inquiry[,] well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and...
not interposed for any improper purpose."32 "Appropriate sanc-
tion[s]" are available to remedy a violation of the obligation, in-
324. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0, 37(b)(2)(C).
325. Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 41, at 52.
326. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (stating that attorneys' fees and excessive costs are
chargeable to the attorney for bad faith); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (stating that attorneys'
fees are chargeable to party if claim is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless); see also
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing courts' inherent power
to impose sanctions against parties and attorneys), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
327. FED. R. CIv. P. 11; see Golden Eagle Dist. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531,
1537 (9th Cir. 1986) (Since strengthening amendments to Rule 11 in 1983, "[iliterally hun-
dreds of published opinions have appeared.").
328. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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cluding assessment of costs and attorneys' fees.329 Some sanction,
however, is mandatory.3
Rule 11 can be an effective device to punish advancement of
frivolous claims and to deter similar conduct by others. Courts,
however, must recognize simultaneously the potential chilling ef-
fect that nonjudicious use of such authority might have on attor-
neys and litigants in unpopular cases. As a result, courts must ex-
amine carefully the entire factual basis of a claim before imposing
sanctions. 3 '
Three additional considerations, however, limit the effective use
of Rule 11 within the context of civil rights litigation. First, in a
significant portion of such actions, those filed pro se, the rule is
applied less strictly.33 2 Second, and more importantly, monetary
sanctions simply are not effective in the case of indigent liti-
gants.333 Third, monetary sanctions have primarily a remedial, not
prospective, effect on some litigants. A number of litigants, partic-
ularly prisoners, persist in filing repeated actions regardless of
their lack of success or exposure to remedial sanctions. 34
In response, courts have developed prospective sanctions in par-
ticularly egregious cases. Relying on their inherent power and the
authority to preclude frivolous cases under section 1915 of Title 28,
courts have imposed numerical restrictions on, or required court
329. Id.
330. Id. Courts apply an objective standard in determining whether the rule has been
violated. "[S]anctions shall be imposed when it appears that a competent attorney could not
form the requisite reasonable belief as to the validity of what is asserted . Oliveri, 803
F.2d at 1275.
331. See id. at 1280-81 (reversing sanction against attorney in civil rights case despite use
of inappropriate boilerplate pleadings in which facts disclosed reasonable basis for suit).
332. See Patterson v. Aiken, 111 F.R.D. 354, 355, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding pro se
litigant held to standard of "layman with his education"), aff'd, 841 F.2d 386 (11th Cir.
1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("absence of legal advice is an appropri-
ate factor to be considered" in determining whether rule violated).
333. See Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1989) (holding that monetary sanc-
tion under Rule 11 not effective as deterrent in in forma pauperis cases); In re Tyler, 839
F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that litigants' lack of funds precluded effective use
of typical Rule 11 sanctions).
334. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) (following denial of in
forma pauperis status in 33 cases, plaintiff paid filing fees for all 33; 22 of those dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).
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approval for, the filing of lawsuits, 33 5 including fee-paid filings s.3 3
Such restrictive conditions, of course, have to be crafted carefully
and limited to only the most extreme cases in order to preserve the
right to meaningful court access. 337 Because a relatively small num-
ber of plaintiffs file a large number of such cases,338 however, care-
fully crafted prospective restrictions can significantly reduce the
volume of litigation.
C. Summary
Courts and defendants have at their disposal an abundance of
procedural mechanisms, such as 28 U.S.C. section 1915 and sum-
mary judgment, that can directly and efficiently dispose of frivo-
lous claims. Other devices also can operate indirectly to reduce the
burden of the volume and nature of civil rights litigation. A more
stringent pleading standard, therefore, is unnecessary. Indeed, em-
ployment of the standard can divert reliance on other more effec-
tive procedures.
Nor does applying the standard add to effective operation of
other procedural devices. First, pleadings are functionally limited
in their ability to uncover the facts necessary to operate those
mechanisms. Discovery, by design, is a much more valuable tech-
nique. All of the mechanisms discussed above are designed to, and
do operate within the liberal pleading framework of Rule 8(a). Sec-
ond, applying a stringent pleading requirement is intrinsically im-
precise, leading to inconsistent application by, and confusion
among, the courts. 3  Third, applying the standard delays, rather
than expedites, resolution and disposition of claims, thereby im-
335. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d at 1295 (limiting inmate to one filing per month under § 1915);
Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir.) (discussing possibility of restrictions on fu-
ture filings pursuant to court's inherent power and authority under § 1915), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 985 (1981).
336. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that inmate
who often paid filing fees required to obtain leave of court for "all civil filings" beyond the
limit of six imposed by the district court).
337. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that order barring all
further in forma pauperis filings violates fourteenth amendment).
338. See supra notes 12-13.
339. E.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 459 (N.D. l. 1982) ("There is
substantial disagreement in this district over what level of specificity in pleading is required
under § 1983.").
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peding the efficiency of other procedures. Courts normally do not
dismiss complaints for failure to meet the standard without afford-
ing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Numerous motions, re-
sponses and continued court involvement result. 40
The standard, operating alone or in conjunction with other pro-
cedures, is not only unnecessary, but also fails to achieve its objec-
tive of quick termination of meritless claims with a reduction in
the burden on courts and defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Applying a stringent standard of factual pleading in civil rights
cases lacks any valid supporting rationale. To the contrary, such a
requirement is functionally inconsistent with the design of modern
federal civil procedure and the role of pleading in that process.
This inconsistency renders the standard inefficient in achieving its
stated purpose. Instead, the standard engenders confusion, uncer-
tainty and delay. Permitted to operate properly, the litigation pro-
cess is entirely capable of efficiently eliminating factually baseless
claims; the heightened pleading requirement simply is unnec-
essary.
Moreover, applying the stringent standard ignores the nature
and purpose of civil rights actions. Rather than facilitating vindi-
cation of constitutional and statutory deprivations as Congress in-
tended, this judicially created rule of procedure has defined civil
rights plaintiffs as a special class of litigants subject to unique and
more stringent procedural treatment. A large portion of that class
pursue their claims without benefit of counsel. Applying the plead-
ing requirement emasculates the doctrine of affording the plead-
ings of such litigants more liberal treatment than provided under
Rule 8(a).
The lack of a valid rationale and the significant competing doc-
trinal and policy considerations suggest that the special pleading
340. One author described a case, brought by two law professors in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, that required eight months of motions and amendments before the court was
able to conclude that "'while the point is very close, we believe plaintiff has pleaded with
sufficient specificity.'" Jennings, The Relationship of Procedure to Substance in Civil
Rights Actions Under Section 1983: No Cause For Complaint?, 12 SETON HALL 1, 15 n.76
(1981) (citations omitted).
990 [Vol. 31:935
1990] PRESUMED FRIVOLOUS 991
rule represents more of a judicial attitude about the character of
civil rights claims than a reasoned solution to a significant prob-
lem. That attitude is based on the explicit assumption that many,
if not all, civil rights actions are unfounded. By requiring that
plaintiffs' pleadings "satisfy" the courts that their claims have
merit, the assumption has been operationally converted into a pre-
sumption of frivolity that must be overcome. As a result, access to
the courts, predicated on open-minded judicial consideration, is
less meaningful.
